An examination of the validity of small state theories to the study of New Zealand foreign policy by Hampton, Rebecca
AN EXAMINATION 
OF THE VALIDITY OF SMALL STATE THEORIES 
TO THE STUDY OF NEW ZEALAND FOREIGN POLICY 
A THESIS 
SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT 
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE 
OF 
MASTERS OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 
IN THE 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY 
BY 
REBECCA HAMPTON 






1. Literature Review 4 
-Realist 4 
-Idealist 6 




-Small state theories: 11 
{i)Defining a small state 
{ii)The characteristics of a small state 
(iii)Criticisms levelled at small state theories 
(iv )Extending small state theories 
-Endnotes 21 
2. New Zealand Foreign Policy and Small State Theories 1944-1954 28 
-Collective Security 30 
-The British Commonwealth 35 
-Regional Security Arrangements 40 
(i)The Canberra Pact and Pacific involvement 
(ii)The securing of an American commitment 
(iii)The South-east Asia Collective Defence Treaty 
-1944-1954: The foreign policy of a small state? 46 
-Endnotes 57 
3. New Zealand Foreign Policy and Small State Theories 1984-1994 62 
-New Zealand's Anti-nuclear Stance 64 
-1987 Defence Review 69 
-Australia and the South Pacific Region 70 
-Collective Security 73 
-International Trade Negotiations 75 
-1984-1994: The foreign policy ofa small state? 79 
-Endnotes 85 
4. Conclusion 90 
-1944-1954 90 
-1984-1994 92 
5. Bibliography 98 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the validity of applying traditional small state theories to the study of New 
Zealand foreign policy. Increasingly such theories have been the target of criticisms which 
highlight their inability to account for diversity amongst states, as well as their failure to 
acknowledge the changing international environment. Critics stress the increased levels of 
interdependence that they believe provides more opportunities for small states to overcome the 
constraints they face thus rendering their propositions obsolete. To ascertain whether such 
criticisms are valid this paper applies small state theories to two ten year periods of New 
Zealand's foreign policy, 1944-1954 and 1984-1994. Evidence of the characteristics associated 
with small states are identified in both periods yet in significant areas its foreign policy behaviour 
diverged from that expected. In these incidences it is necessary to acknowledge the influence of 
variables from other theoretical perspectives utilised in the study of foreign policy and the 
interaction that occurs between these different perspectives. Thus whilst not rendering small state 
theories obsolete, the application of variables from alternative theories to the study of its foreign 
policy enables a more comprehensive multicausal examination than that provided by small state 
theories alone. New Zealand in both periods exhibited the characteristics of a small state and was 
therefore constrained in the way such theories identify, yet due to the changes in the international 
environment, and it's unique historical and geographical position, it was able to overcome these 
constraints. It is therefore necessary to be aware of alternative perspectives when applying small 
state theories to the study of New Zealand's foreign policy. The impact of environmental and 
societal determinants must be acknowledged, as must the focus be turned within small state 
theories from that of viability, to include the potential benefits small size can offer in an 
international arena increasingly characterised by interdependence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally in the study of New Zealand's foreign policy it has been theories relating 
to size, specifically small state theories, which have been the chief analytical tools 
utilised. These theories seek to explain foreign policy behaviour by focusing on the 
constraints experienced by small states in the international arena and the corresponding 
impact this has upon policy options, direction and implementation. They identify 
similarities in the experience of small states which therefore enable theorists to predict 
behaviour. However increasingly the use of size-based explanations for the foreign 
policy of states has come under scrutiny for a variety of reasons. Some such as Thakur 
believe small state theories "confuse more than clarify" 1. Others point to changes in 
the world order, a diffusion of power and control, as being responsible for causing 
such models to become increasingly irrelevant. Changes in the conventional global 
power structure, and the rise of interdependence, may be seen to override the 
constraints traditionally believed to bind small state behaviour in the international 
arena thus rendering them obsolete. Changes too caused by decolonisation and the 
dramatic rise in the number and diversity of small and micro states, has meant such a 
grouping is increasingly heterogeneous and as such "cannot be expected to respond in 
the same way to similar stimuli112. 
Criticism too has been directed at the central premise of small state theories, that there 
is a commonality of experience that causes a small state to act in its foreign policy 
initiatives in a similar, predictable manner to other small states. Clark and Payne for 
example suggest that although the behaviour of small states appears distinctive in some 
respects in others it is not that different from the behaviour oflarger states3. The 
interests of small states they maintain correspond with the interests of all states 
regardless of size. The defining criteria for small states is also problematic as 
illustrated by New Zealand's position in the Pacific. Although traditional perceived to 
be a small state, within the South Pacific it is evidently a developed state both 
economically and politically and compared to its island neighbours relatively large. 
The use of small state theories as an analytical tool to explain New Zealand foreign 
policy is therefore increasingly questionable. Not only do its recent foreign policy 
initiatives show clear divergence's away from the predicted behaviour of small states 
but its unique position economically, historically and geographically call into question 
some of the basic assumptions made in the literature relating to small state theories. 
This study will therefore examine the relevance of applying conventional small state 
theories to the study ofNew Zealand's foreign policy in light of this criticism as well as 
the changes that are evident in both the existing world structure and in its own 
perception of itself as an independent nation. 
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To ascertain whether size-based explanations of New Zealand foreign policy are 
indeed still viable this paper will initially examine the background to the study of 
foreign policy and international relations before reviewing the literature on small state 
theories themselves to establish the characteristics attributed to such states, and the 
corresponding impact of these upon policy formulation. An overview of the criticisms 
levelled at these theories will then be made and an alternative approach, aimed at 
meeting these criticisms, outlined. Examination will then be made of two particular 
time periods in New Zealand history focusing on the foreign policy initiatives it 
followed, the reasons why and if these can be seen to correspond to the behaviour 
traditional small state theories prescribe. The first period to be examined will be from 
1944-1954. The Department of External Affairs had just been established at this time 
and New Zealand was beginning to develop, where it had not before, a more 
independent foreign policy outlook. However New Zealand still clearly identified itself 
with Europe and existed within tight security and trade arrangements with a small 
number of powerful allies. The second period to be examined will be from 1984-1994 
and will thus endeavour to encapsulate the changes that occurred as a result of the 
break in the Cold War and the corresponding diffusion of power. By analysing two 
such time periods therefore, an examination can be made as to the relevance over time 
of applying traditional small state theories to the study of New Zealand's foreign 
policy. The alternative approach which aims at extending traditional small state 
theories, by examining how va1iables from other perspectives interact in the 
formulation of foreigi1 policy, can also be tested. 
For the purposes of this study the area of foreign policy examined will be confined to 
matters relating to security. This will not only aid in limiting the breadth of the study 
but also maintains the focus on the area which small state theorists believe set such 
states apart from their larger counterparts, namely the limitations they face in attaining 
security. With regard to New Zealand, and corresponding to characteristics identified 
by small state theorists, economic and trade concerns will be included in the study as 
they are closely tied to the search for security, particularly in the latter period. 
Such an examination of the validity of size-based explanations of foreign policy should 
prove useful for a number of reasons. Not only will it provide insight into the impact 
that the changing international environment and other factors can have upon small 
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state behaviour but also how these effect the validity of conventional theories. 
Considering the increased questioning of small state theories this examination will 
provide an opportunity to ascertain whether these criticisms can be seen to hold true in 
the case of New Zealand. Thus by studying the actions of a small state such as New 
\ 
Zealand and the factors both domestically and internationally that have shaped its 
foreign policy, the usefulness of small state theories as a conceptual framework can be 
tested. 
ENDNOTES 
(1 )Thakur, R. 'The Elusive Essence of Size: Australia, New Zealand and Small States 
in International Relations" in International Relations: Global and Australian 
Perspective's on an Evolving Discipline. Editors Riggott, R. and Richardson, J.L. 
Canberra Studies in World Affairs, Canberra 1991 :241. 
(2)ibid:282. 
(3)Clarke, C. & Payne, T. (eds.) Politics and Development in Small States. Allen and 




In the study of foreign policy analysts attempt to develop a better understanding of 
what motivates states to act in the international arena in the way that they do, and this 
in turn enables them to, as Jensen claims, "make more accurate predictions about 
international events and in so doing respond more effectively to such events" 1. To do 
so, however, it is necessary to begin by employing certain tools to analyse the factors 
that shape the external behaviour of states. Due to the range of information available 
this is not an easy task. A variety of approaches and models have developed and are 
currently utilised in the field of foreign policy analysis to make the study of 
international relations more scientific and thus more fruitful. Post World War One, two 
paradigms, the Realist and the Idealist, dominated the field but with the behavioural 
revolution of the 1950's a third approach emerged. 
REALIST 
The realist approach, emerging from the Hobbesian tradition, focuses on the nation-
state and its struggle to survive in an international arena characterised by anarchy and 
conflict. In its assertion that the central concept characterising the international system 
is power this model attempts to explain international relations in terms of an inter-state 
struggle for power. "Realism emphasises the role of states as legally independent and 
sovereign actors, competing with one another for power in a world of conflict and 
possible war112. Within this system states must rely upon their own resources to ensure 
survival as political integration between states is short-lived and the impact of 
transnational actors insignificant3. As each state struggles to defend its territory and 
interests the question of security dominates the hierarchy of issues in international 
politics and power becomes the most important concept in predicting behaviour. On 
this basis theories developed that sought to compare behaviour across various state 
units and look for patterns of behaviour associated with types of states. The primary 
area of study therefore is the interplay of states on the international stage with three 
central assumptions underlying the paradigm. "First, states are sufficiently similar for 
them to be appropriately treated as a single category of actors; secondly that 
governments of states are effectively in control of intermiJ developments and external 
behaviour; and thirdly, that outcomes in the international arena are arrived at mainly as 
a result of the behaviour and interplay of states not of any other actors or of any other 
processes than state interaction"4. 
The focus of study in the Realist approach is therefore the nation~state and the factors 
which impinge upon its capacity to implement and enforce foreign policy decisions. As 
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Handel maintained when studying states "it is important to analyse their respective 
capacities to protect, maintain or further their national interests"5. The capacity to act 
independently involves an equation which combines an analysis of the resources a state 
commands, its ability to use them and its predisposition to act with the range of 
choices available. Every state can be seen to have constraints laid upon it which 
mitigate its freedom to act. Such freedom "is a relative thing, conditioned by factors 
and circumstances which states can and do modify by their actions but which they 
cannot wholly control or escape from"6. 
Theories developed therefore, that focussed upon the factors which impinge upon a 
states capacity to implement and enforce foreign policy decisions. By acknowledging a 
central assumption, that all states have similar interests but that out of necessity they 
modify their actions due to the resources available and the power they are able to 
wield, distinctions are made between states, and groups formed based upon the nature 
of the constraints they face and the corresponding limits these place upon their 
capacity to act. Groups of states so identified would therefore be seen to demonstrate 
certain common, irreducible and specific characteristics and correspond to certain 
broad patterns of behaviour. The groupings would also indicate "the limits beyond 
which the paradigm members of the stated class will tend to incur abnormal or 
counter-productive costs in pursuit of a certain type of policy" 7. 
Proponents of this approach identify key areas in which the capacity to act can be seen 
to influence foreign policy behaviour: 
(l)Limitations on a nation's resources will place limitations on the foreign 
policy activities of that nation. 
(2)The lower a nation's capacity to act, the greater proportion of its foreign 
policy energy will be directed to substantive problem areas involving economic 
matters. 
(3)The lower a nation's capacity to act, the narrower the scope of action of its 
foreign policy behaviour. 
( 4)The lower a nation's capacity to act, the larger the proportion of foreign 
policy behaviour taking place in a multilateral setting. 
(5)The lower a nation's capacity to act, the greater proportion of high 
commitment and high negative affect in its foreign policy behaviour8. 
Small state theories, falling as they do within this approach, focus upon these factors 
and their potential influence, as shall be examined. 
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IDEALIST 
Proponents of the Idealist perspective disagree with the Realist view that international 
relations are necessarily anarchic believing that "international disputes, like those 
occurring within civil society, could and should be mitigated, adjudicated or resolved 
through the application of generally recognised rules and procedures"9. Idealists posit 
an international society that recognises such concepts as sovereign status, sovereign 
equality, non-intervention and the right to national self-defence. With the use of such 
tools as international institutions, collective security, international laws and mutual aid 
proponents of this approach perceived a 'new world order' characterised by 
cooperation between states 1 O. 
Since World War Two the Idealist perspective has emphasised the growing evidence 
of interdependence in the international political arena and the corresponding impact 
this has had upon the nature of international relations. The plethora of international 
organisations that have been established, as with the economic, technological and 
cultural processes of global change, have resulted in the weakening of state 
boundaries 11. Such developments, theorists believe, have rendered the state unable to 
act autonomously to the extent Realist theories base their analysis upon. The 
traditional notion of sovereignty which assumes "that the state has control over its 
own fate, subject only to compromises it must make and limits imposed upon it by 
actors, agencies and forces operating within its territorial boundaries" is, through the 
processes of increased 'globalisation', being challenged 12. Even the most powerful of 
states have become vulnerable to penetration and as such the distinction between 
domestic and foreign policy has become blurred. 
Kegley and Wittkopf identify the characterising features of interdependence which, 
they maintain, impact upon a state's foreign policy. They focus on the multiple 
channels of communication that have developed between societies both formally and 
informally and the increased number and variety of issues concerned. All states are as 
a consequence limited in their foreign policy by these connections as well as by the 
transnational and transgovemmental actors who not only increase the potential cost of 
certain action but also increasingly force domestic issues on to the international stage. 
"The attitudes and policy stands of domestic groups are likely to be affected by 
communications, organised or not, between them and counterparts abroad" 13 . Kegley 
and Wittkopf main~ain that in such an environment the use of military force has 
become a far more costly foreign policy instrument. Where force was seen as an 
\ 
acceptable instrument,of policy in the realist model it is, due to interdependence, 
increasingly costly in an international arena characterised by the emerging pre-
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eminence of trade and economics 14. The traditional advantages of size now compete 
with economic power, product distribution and the increased potential for cooperation 
between smaller states. It can be seen, therefore, that as the international structure has 
changed so has the power hierarchy within the system and the interactive patterns 
exhibited. International organisations and the structures they put in place such as legal 
and moral norms not only define salient issues but shape the strategies adopted. They 
provide for cooperation and political integration thus enabling states to overcome the 
limitations they face standing alone, in turn affecting their foreign policy outputs. 
DECISION~MAKING THEORIES 
With the behavioural revolution of the 1950's and in light of increased criticism of the 
Realist approach which had come to dominate the post World War Two study of 
international relations, theories that focussed on the domestic political determinants of 
foreign policy developed. The Realist approach was criticised as being oversimplified, 
in that domestic and international actors were ignored, and as such this approach was 
believed to be of minimal explanatory value15. The central assumption harnessed to 
the Realist approach, the rational actor model, was also criticised. The rational actor 
model views states as unitary, monolithic and solitary actors on the international 
stage 16. Individual decision makers and the decision making process of a state are 
seen to be inconsequential in that it is assumed that decisions are the result of a 
rational process of utility maximisation. "Foreign policy decisions are made by decision 
makers who carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages likely to follow from 
alternative policies" 17. As such an action~reaction model is postulated whereby a 
state's actions are seen as the rational, calculated response to a move made by 
another 18. Conflict arises therefore only when there is a genuine difference of interests 
between states, not because of irrational choices. Rational actor models however, in 
assuming the state is a unitary actor, fail to look at domestic influences that may 
impact upon foreign policy decisions such as the leaders, type of government, 
characteristics of the society or the political conditions 19. By assuming rationality, 
factors such as physical impediments to the flow of information and the distortion of 
reality caused by attitudes, beliefs or faulty expectations in decision makers are 
ignored. Assumptions therefore that decisions are the result of a rational weighing up 
of advantages and disadvantages fail to acknowledge the impediments that can bound 
rationality. 
With the vast increase in newly independent states since World War Two, and the 
affect this had upon the international environment, criticism also highlighted the Euro-
centric nature of such models and their relevance to the variety of states that have 
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emerged. Increasingly therefore the need for more comprehensive theories that sought 
to understand foreign policy not simply in terms of the capacity to act but as a result of 
a state's relationship with all aspects of its environment, both domestically and 
internationally, was acknowledged. Partly in response to these criticisms theories that 
focus on the domestic political determinants of foreign policy developed. These 
theories "offered not so much a new paradigm as more rigorous methods of 
enquiry"20. Theorists focus on a wide variety of factors involved in foreign policy, 
from how decisions are made and implemented to how the external environment and 
external actors influence the process21 . These approaches utilise a behavioural, rather 
than a Realist approach to the study of foreign policy, in which the state becomes its 
decision makers22. Factors that limit rationality are identified and examined in an 
attempt to understand decision making to an extent Rational Actor Models fail to 
address. 
Organisational Processes 
Within the decision making model emphasis is placed on the individuals and 
organisations involved in the formulation of foreign policy as decisions are seen as less 
the result of deliberate choice than as the output of a large organisation with 
established patterns ofbehaviour23. The standard operating procedures of the 
organisations within a government are believed to shape foreign policy outputs 
through a process of interaction and adjustment. The actor is no longer seen as a 
monolithic nation, rather as a constellation of organisations only partly coordinated by 
government leaders24. Analysts recognise not only standard operating procedures 
within such organisations but also relatively stable propensities concerning operational 
priorities, perceptions and issues which act to shape foreign policy25. Advocates of 
this approach therefore maintain that an examination of a states organisational 
structure can offer significant insight into the policies they produce. 
Bureaucratic Politics 
Building on the organisational model are bureaucratic theories which emphasise the 
role of the bureaucrats involved in the decision making process. As the individuals 
responsible for providing information and advice to policy makers, as well as 
implementing the decisions made, the potential to shape policy is evident. Bureaucratic 
politics therefore examines "foreign policy as if it resulted from the interaction of 
individual bureaucrats playing political games to advance both their own and their 
organisations interests1126. Decisions, rather than representing a rational calculation, 
are the result of bargaining amongst individuals "who act in terms ofno consistent set 
of strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, 
9 
organisational and personal goals1127. The resulting output is therefore a compromise 
shaped by both organisational processes and the individual political skill of the players. 
Proponents of this approach examine the interplay between the individuals involved in 
the development and implementation of foreign policy in an attempt to more fully 
understand its origins whilst also acknowledging the affects of bargaining between the 
organisational units within the state. 
Human Dimensions 
The narrowing of the focus of examination to the individual decision maker, as seen in 
the bureaucratic model, is taken further in models with their roots in the psychological 
and cognitive field. In the examination of foreign policy these theories look at the 
impact ofidiosyncratic or personality differences in those responsible. Cognition, 
defined as the acquiring, organising and using of knowledge, becomes the focus for 
explaining the variations and aberrations evident in the performance of decision 
makers28. Holsti refers to the gap between 'image' and 'reality' resulting from physical 
impediments to the flow of information and other factors which distort reality in the 
individual therefore rendering the psychological environment different from the 
physical reality29. Clark and White divide the study into descriptive and psychological 
explanations with the former focusing on human cognition while the latter examines 
consistency and motivational theories3 O. Cybernetic theories of decision making, 
developed by Steinbruner, also address the cognitive processes of the individuals 
concerned claiming that when faced with a complex problem an institutional approach 
aimed at minimising the calculations involved is often adopted31 . The final output 
therefore reflects this selective process, which utilises only a small set of critical 
variables. Theories that identify the cognitive processes of the individuals involved as 
having a key impact on the decisions made, and in turn the study of foreign policy; are 
however criticised for their lack of theoretical development and coherence. Clarke and 
White identify the "limited understanding of the relationship between perception and 
behaviour and of the circumstances in which cognitive aben-ations are likely to have a 
significant impact upon foreign policy1132. 
Environmental /Societal Determinants 
Still within the decision making paradigm are theories that relate to the environment in 
which decision makers operate and how this can affect foreign policy outputs. Political 
structures and societal characteristics such as national character, nationalism, societal 
structure and stability all impact on foreign policy in that they impose constraints and 
provide opportunities3 3. By remaining relatively stable they provide continuity in a 
field characterised by constant fluctuations. Other factors that shape individual's belief 
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systems are also examined as they provide the "prism through which decision makers 
view reality034. Historical tradition, collective experiences and specific political beliefs 
generate the range of options considered thus influencing the formulation of foreign 
policy. The geographical location of a state is also considered to be an influential 
factor in the formulation of its foreign policy. "Leaders' perceptions of available 
foreign policy options are influenced by the geopolitical circumstances that define their 
countries' place on the world stage1135. Shared national frontiers and close proximity 
to other states, especially to great powers, are believed to have a direct impact on the 
level of intervention and involvement in world affairs a state exhibits. Similarly the 
impact of external actors and the structures of the international system are considered 
as decision makers take into account the wider political context. As with the Realist 
approach, an action-reaction model is adopted that examines the levels of 
reciprocation in foreign policy behaviour and the affect this has on decision makers36. 
The specific circumstances surrounding a decision also warrant consideration 
according to proponents of this theory. The situational context aids in an 
understanding of the decisions made. For example in a crisis situation the number of 
individuals involved in the process tends to decrease and less alternatives are presented 
thus resulting in an output that is therefore not necessarily the product of a high degree 
of bargaining and compromise as bureaucratic theories maintain37. All of these factors 
are viewed as determinants in the decision making approach and are therefore 
examined in an attempt to provide a more comprehensive explanation for foreign 
policy outputs. 
There is debate however as to the relative potency of internal versus external variables 
in accounting for foreign policy. Theorists such as Reynolds criticise the micro- or 
internal level of analysis for exaggerating the differences between states while the 
system-oriented model he believes tends to produce a black box concept of the units 
with a high degree of determinism3 8. Others stress the need to focus on interaction 
between the levels of analysis and the variables they encompass. East, Salmore and 
Hermann state that it "seems unlikely that examining the relationships between a single 
perspective and foreign policy behaviour will produce an adequate explanation of these 
external behaviours"39. By reviewing the process of foreign policy formulation 
through a series of different analytical paradigms, at the human level, the state level 
and the international systemic level, all aspects of a states environment can be taken 
into account and the relationship between the domestic and international systemic 
constraints acknowledged. Whilst system variables are largely responsible for setting 
the context within which a nation's capacity to act is defined the impact of other 
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internal variables, ranging from the influence of regime characteristics and 
organisational framework on the ability to use resources to the leaders perceptions of 
the opportunities and constraints that exist, mediate the relationship between these and 
foreign policy behaviour. Therefore, it seems unlikely that studying foreign policy from 
a single perspective will produce a suitably comprehensive, multicausal, explanation. 
SMALL STATE THEORIES 
Having thus outlined the broad theoretical framework in the study of foreign policy, 
small state theories clearly fall within models relating to the capacity to act. East, 
Salmore and Hermann define a states capacity to act as a function of its amount of 
resources, its ability to utilise the resources and its predisposition to act40. Differences 
in the capacity to act between states, manifests in substantive differences in foreign 
policy, and it is upon this basis that small state theories have developed. Reynolds, in 
placing the influences upon foreign policy on a continuum ranging from those of a 
constant nature to the more volatile, locates factors such as size on the more constant 
end, as it provides a relatively stable and constant influence over time41 . Due to this 
fact, and as these theories continue to dominate the literature on New Zealand foreign 
policy, it is necessary to study them in more detail. 
Small state theories focus upon the constraints small size impose and the 
corresponding effect this has upon the capacity of such states to protect, maintain or 
further their national interests. The unique conditions often experienced by small 
states, such as their limited human and material resources, their economic dependence 
through trade, and an inability to physically defend their own territory, become the 
constraints that analysts believe come to characterise small state foreign policy. 
Although the characteristics of small state behaviour are generally agreed upon as shall 
be examined, there is evident a lack of consensus on how to define small and which, if 
any, indicators of size should be utilised. The development of a theory on small states 
is made more difficult by the fact that on the methodological level 'smallness' can be 
approached either relationally or attributively. 
Defining a 'small state' 
Many theorists acknowledge the arbitrary nature of such a distinction but nevertheless 
attempt to set criteria. Sutton and Payne believe that the concept of smallness, being 
relative "will continually undergo revision according to the configuration of the 
international system at the time and the particular characteristics of the small state 
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which are being examined"42. Maintaining that the capacity to act is a function of both 
the amount of resources a state commands and its ability to utilise these resources 
Fauriol concluded two variables of size must be considered- "the resources and power 
base of states (population, territorial power, military resources) and national 
development issues ( GNP per capita, industrialisation, energy use etc. )"43 . East also 
divides the capacity to act into two general factors- size and the level of social 
organisation44. Whilst size taps the total resources potentially available, social 
organisation examines the internal characteristics of a state. Population size has 
however been generally accepted in much of the literature as the most fruitful point of 
departure as it is population size that indicates the limits and potential of a state. 
Territorial size is not always pertinent as land mass does not always equate with low 
population levels, the United Kingdom for example. Economic development also 
proves somewhat problematic as there are examples of states with small territorial size 
and small populations yet strong, developed economies. Thus to enable comparative 
analysis it is population that shall be utilised as the defining characteristic of 'small 
state'. As Purnell states, population is the most important resource of a state and is the 
chief means by which a state can attempt to meet its needs and fulfil its desires45. 
Reynolds, while agreeing that size is indicative of a states limits and potential, stresses 
that the use of such statistics by themselves are of little value as they are significant 
only in relation to all other elements of a states situation46. Widening the criteria to 
include other elements would however, whilst meeting the criticisms levelled at this 
theoretical approach, take the model beyond the traditional boundaries of the Realist 
perspective from which it was developed. By adhering to the most widely accepted 
criteria small state theories can be studied in their traditional sense and through 
application the impact of, and interaction between, other variables will more easily be 
identified. 
This established it is necessary to employ a population cut-off point which 
distinguishes small states. The Commonwealth Secretariat has generally employed a 
cut-off point of less than one million while conceding that this ideally might be too 
narrow a conception47. It then goes on to include in its study Jamaica with a 
population of over two million and Papua New Guinea (population over three million) 
arguing that they share characteristics and maintain integral links with all small states 
in their respective regions. Sutton and Payne point out that the limit may depend upon 
the area the categoriser is specialising in and claim that for political scientists a 
population cut-off point of five million would be suitable whilst further distinguishing a 
smaller category, the micro-state48. They criticise the Commonwealth Secretariats one 
million population cut-off point as being in response to changes in the international 
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system which during the 1960s saw a dramatic dse in the number of states with 
populations of less than one million being granted independence. Instead of including 
these in a micro-state category the response was simply to lower the overall cut~off 
point. Since any consideration of size is "based on the underlying idea that the essence 
of smallness is either a lack of influence on the environment and a lack of immunity 
against influences from it or both" a fixed population level of five million will be used 
in this instance as the criteria for inclusion in the category of 'small state' with a 
further distinction of micro-states existing within this49. 
If one examines New Zealand in the light of such deliberation the central paradox is 
evident. Traditionally it has unquestionably been allocated the status of small state. 
This primarily arose from a close identification with the developed world from which it 
drew its values and aspirations as well as political and constitutional traditions. By the 
standards of the OECD (Europe-based Organisation of Economic Co-operation and 
Development) New Zealand is indeed small. However this perception alters somewhat 
when one considers the regional position and perspective. Compared with the myriad 
of Pacific Nations New Zealand is a large, developed state. If one looks at the list of 
nations recognised by the United Nations it would appear halfway down the list if 
ranked according to population size50. The large marine terdtory it commands also 
confuses the perception of size. However a cut-off point must be established, albeit 
arbitrary, to enable comparative analysis. By utilising population as the criteria and 
setting the cut-off point at five million the use of small state models in the study of 
New Zealand foreign policy is in theory made valid however closer examination is 
required to see if this is appropriate and if the characteristics they prescribe provide an 
explanation for the direction of its foreign policy. 
The characteristics qf a small state 
So what exactly are the characteristics small state theories prescribe, how are these 
characteristics peculiar to small states, and how do they effect foreign policy decision 
making? From reviewing the literature several basic conditions are seen to exist in 
many small states which in tum effect the capacity of such states to act independently. 
Primarily these are a result of the economic and resource limitations many small states 
face. Although not experienced by all, limitations in both human and material 
resources leave many small states in positions of vulnerability and, due to these 
limitations, unable to meet their security needs. Economically small states are often 
faced with home markets that are not large enough to sustain self-sufficient economic 
growth and that provide limited opportunities to diversify. This in turn is compounded 
by their narrow resource base and the difficulties presented in attaining penetration 
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into foreign markets. As a result most small states find themselves dependent on trade 
and within this even more constrained by the product and market concentration which 
often characterises small state trading pattems51 . Small state theorists do not claim 
that these limitations exist for all small states and acknowledge clear examples to the 
contrary such as Singapore. However they postulate that such conditions and 
limitations can be obse1ved with enough regularity to justify a model based upon such 
an assumption of common experience. These conditions therefore give rise to certain 
characteristics that are peculiar to small states. 
An example of one such common experience is the resulting openness that small state 
dependence on international trade renders necessary. This leads to a conspicuous 
vulnerability in the position of small states to adverse trends internationally whilst at 
the same time they lack the capacity to exert any influence over such trends. This 
external economic dependence therefore leads to sensitivity and instability within a 
small state that not only heightens the risk of foreign penetration but also by its very 
nature can erode a small states independence and autonomy52. Small states thus often 
find their economic security dependent upon foreign actors whose behaviour is not 
subject to their authority and as a direct result small state foreign policy cannot afford 
to be isolated from its trade concerns and priorities. Often therefore when dealing with 
trading partners, and in most affairs in the international arena, for small states 
''independence of mind and policies in such situations are thought a commodity too 
costly"53. The focus of a small state's foreign policy is as such often characterised by 
a clear economic focus and a tight connection between domestic and external affairs. 
Security for a small state, as reflected in its foreign policy, is therefore evidently more 
concerned with attaining economic security and thus demonstrates a broader 
conception of threat than that oflarger powers 54. "Thus the cost of continued viability 
as a national entity is often political quiescence, compromise, or the sacrifice of 
political principles to economic necessity"55. 
When one turns to physical or military security the limitations that small states face are 
clearly evident. Small states due to their limited resources both materially and in 
human terms often lack the capacity to physically defend their territory or meet their 
security needs. Militarily for a small state it is difficult to maintain a modern, 
conventional military establishment without over-reaching its resource capabilities. 
However as some sense of security is a pre-condition of independent action and 
autonomous decision-making, small states must look for other means to attain security 
without compromising to too great an 'extent their political independence and 
freedom56. For small states this is often in the form of an association or alliance which 
can act to offset the costs involved in providing security and provides a total 
expenditure possible that would normally far exceed a small states potential. There is 
however a clear down side to such defence arrangements in that a small state thus 
committed may find itself involved in costly conflicts beyond its regional area of 
concern or be expected to take part in defence planning inappropriate to its own 
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needs. Even more significant, a small state in such an alliance or association may fmd it 
does in fact act in such a way that it further impinges upon the states independence to 
act autonomously. 
Thus small states tend to look further to the security provided by international laws 
and organisations in their quest to attain greater security. Such laws and organisations 
provide for small states a cost efficient means of pursuing their interests in the 
international arena. Small states, by their very nature and the limitations they face, are 
typically characterised by a limited ability to change conditions in the international 
environment. This coupled with their vulnerability to external pressure usually renders 
them less viable as an independent member of the international community57. 
However by emphasising international law and taking an active role in international 
organisations, small states are able to exert influence internationally and pursue their 
national interests in a wider international context. This influence as such may be 
disproportionate to the actual size and leverage that the state maintains. For a small 
state international laws also "constitute a handy moral, if not actual, defence against 
intervention"58. International organisations provide a framework within which small 
states can build coalitions and pursue collective bargaining whilst the costs of the 
collective security and enforcement they provide are generally home by the major 
powers involved. Thus small states see "in strong support for international law and the 
operations ofintemational organisations the best safeguards for long-term security"59. 
Within international organisations small states look to maximise their influence by 
collaborating with others that have similar interests. Small states therefore are often 
involved in a higher rate of multilateral initiatives within international organisations 
and initiate more co-operative events60. 
The resource constraints experienced by small states are also reflected in the nature, 
operation and effectiveness of their diplomatic service. The limits that small size places 
on the human and economic resources at their disposal means small state foreign 
policy is often limited in range and extent. "The size and professionalism of a country's 
diplomatic service often provides a measure of the weight a state carries within the 
international system, indicating the level of human and economic resources it is able 
and willing to commit in search of international influence"61 . Due to the constraints 
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they face therefore the foreign policy initiatives of a small state tend to be narrow in 
scope to enable a greater concentration of their scarce resources on the areas of 
greatest concern. This does however give small states an advantage in that, unlike 
larger states which are often involved in a number of important foreign policy 
initiatives concurrently, they are able to concentrate all their energies on a single issue 
and as a result can have a better knowledge of the issues and fewer distractions62. 
However small states do not have at their disposal the same foreign policy instruments 
that a larger state may wield. For example large states can reward and punish whereas 
small states are forced to confine themselves to diplomatic instruments such as 
persuasion and the pursuing of a moral stance that incur less in the way of costs. 
Thus small state foreign policy is characterised by the use of certain tools which are 
utilised through necessity as they canJ7 with them less in the way of costs. For example 
by focusing on international legal norms small states are able to utilise cheap and 
unthreatening rhetoric which as such is less likely to anger or alienate important allies 
or trading partners. Not only therefore is small state foreign policy often limited in 
range but it must be by nature carefully managed to minimise risks and reduce the 
impact of policy failure. Small states have essentially the same interests as large states 
but must in their foreign policy initiatives make modifications to reflect their resource 
limitations and power disparities63. They are therefore more likely to take low-profile 
action to minimise both the risks involved and the expenditure of their scarce 
resources. 
At this point however there are differences in the literature on small state foreign 
policy, with some theorists such as Thakur, positing an alternative model which sees 
small states as being involved in less ambiguous and more high~risk behaviour 
precisely because of the resource limitations they face64. Such theories postulate that 
because small states lack the diplomatic tools to perceive events and developments in 
the international arena quickly enough they are then left with fewer policy options and 
as a result are often forced to adopt far less ambiguous and more specific behaviour. 
Maurice East made a study of just such claims which appeared to support this 
alternative theory although he himself acknowledged the need for further research 65. 
Within the foreign policy units of small states therefore business is often carried out on 
a different scale than in a larger state. The lack of adequate information gathering 
effects not only the capacity to prepare and chose alternatives but the machinery itself 
is smaller and as such policy formulation may lack institutionalisation. As such there 
may be a more personal influence on policy making which can easily develop an 
element of passion and personal involvement not evident in larger states. "There is a 
greater likelihood that it be the product of a single, dominant mind and less that of a 
committee striving for a comprehensive view"66. This can however prove to be 
advantageous allowing for far greater flexibility and responsiveness than may be 
evident within the foreign policy units of larger states. 
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Small.size therefore, and the constraints it imposes upon a states foreign policy 
formulation, falls under the propositions relating to the capacity to act. The limitations 
on a small states resources result in limitations on its foreign policy activities. The 
focus of its foreign policy is narrow out of necessity and within this a high proportion 
relates to economic matters. The foreign policy tools utilised reflect the need to avoid 
high costs, such as an emphasis on international laws and organisations as well as the 
use of alliances and associations to offset the costs associated with achieving security. 
The nature, operation and effectiveness of a small states diplomatic service is also 
effected. This some contend may result in small states exhibiting more aggressive 
foreign policy behaviour as the result of a lack of adequate intelligence, misinformation 
or the dominance of any given individual within the machinery. Therefore due to the 
characteristics of size that limit a small states capacity to act, size becomes the factor 
which Hsets the limits to what can be attained and fixes the international role and status 
of the nation more securely than any other"67. The constraints that small states have 
laid upon them by nature of their very size are what make their policies qualitatively 
different and that set them apart within the international arena. However small state 
theories have increasingly come under questioning for a variety of reasons which must 
also be examined. 
Criticisms levelled at small state theories 
Much of the earliest literature produced on small state theories originated from studies 
conducted in, and focusing on, European states. This in itself many find problematic as 
the models they put forward are by nature Euro-centric and therefore it may be 
suspect to apply their propositions to other small states. This is of particular relevance 
when one looks at the vast increase in the number of small states that emerged 
following the de-colonisation movement of the 1960s and the historical and 
environmental differences that exist between these states and those in Europe that 
small state theories were modelled on 68. Thus the increasingly diverse membership of 
the category 'small state' may some maintain make it more difficult to assign any 
common denominator other than their overall weakness 69. Small states in the 1990s 
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can be seen to exhibit a variety of diplomatic styles, varying political complexions and 
diverse international allegiances therefore bringing into question the assumption that 
they will respond in the same way to similar stimuli 70. Small states in more isolated 
parts of the world may also find it easier to escape the constraints traditionally 
associated with size thus enabling them to free themselves :from "the historical 
cobwebs in re-conceptualising security concerns and survival strategies" 71 . However 
despite these criticisms many of the constraints small states face, regardless of their 
location or political orientation, would seem to have remained the same. The nature of 
the threats to security they perceive may alter with time and place but the basic 
limitations that small size will place upon possible responses remain. Small state 
theories have never tried to claim all states will respond in a similar fashion to similar 
stimuli rather they postulate that if a small state chooses to act in a way that shows 
little regard as to its limitations it will incur abnormal or counter-productive costs. 
Thus there exists the potential for making predictions. 
Another difficulty posed by the hegemonic position of the existing theoretical literature 
on small states is a tendency to approach small states from the point of view of 
smallness being problematic 72. In the early literature small state viability is often the 
central concern. As Thakur points out, changes in the international system since small 
state theories first came into prominence have made this focus on viability increasingly 
redundant. "With the security of a state not challenged, theories originating in the 
security dilemma cannot explain the state's behaviour" 73 . The decrease in the second 
half of the twentieth century of the autonomy and sovereignty of nation-states due to 
supranational organisations such as the United Nations have given small states both a 
more equal standing internationally as well as creating an important means by which to 
bypass some of the problems created by size 74. Small states in the twentieth century 
also experience greater political power vis-a-vis larger states some maintain due to 
international opinion which, with the advances in technology and media capability, 
serve to limit the independent actions of all states 7 5. The problems of political 
organisation and control traditionally associated with small size have eased with the 
development of modern means of communication and transport 7 6. 
Recent criticisms of small state theories also perceive these changes in the international 
system as providing, for small states, a greater opportunity to carry out independent 
foreign policy that traditional small state theories do not take into account. Not only 
do international organisations StJCh as the United Nations offer small states an arena 
for international contact with the chance to express political views and even exert a 
disproportionate influence, but as the international environment has become less 
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aligned, constraints that existed in the past appear to have lessened in influence 77. 
Greater regionalism and fragmentation of nation~states on the international stage also 
mean that small states receive less attention from the great powers, there is less fear of 
escalation of disputes and a greater number of international actors and organisations 
have come into existence which act to diffuse power and authority 78. For small states 
this means theoretically that they are less constrained in their actions than in the past 
and thus the usefulness of traditional models that use these constraints as a point of 
departure must be questioned. However when assessing such criticisms one must bear 
in mind the struggle international organisations such as the United Nations face when 
it comes to deciding on and then enforcing any of their declarations and therefore take 
care not to overemphasis their influence. Small states within such organisations still 
find themselves at a disadvantage when it comes to initiating policy issues and more 
often than not still have to rely on the support of others to push their objectives. 
Further criticisms levelled at small state theories maintain that the increased 
uncertainty in the international arena created by the end of the Cold War has meant 
that small states find themselves in a unique position to maximise their 
manoeuvrability, especially in regard to the great powers and thus maximise their 
influence and offset the constraints they traditionally faced 79. Since "the position and 
relative security of any weak state must be gauged in terms of the specific international 
system in which it is operating" this could be seen to be ofimportance80. However 
such power is by its nature derivative not intrinsic and so the basic conditions that 
constrain small state behaviour are still seen to exist despite the possibilities presented 
by these changes. Other theorists maintain that changing perceptions of security and 
threat render small state theories increasingly obsolete. In the nuclear age for example 
the threat of conventional attack has been greatly diluted and thus the constraints 
placed on small states due to their inability to adequately provide for their own 
security would therefore no longer be of significance 81. However as established 
previously, small states are often characterised by a wider perception of threat that 
takes into account their economically precarious position and thus changes of this 
nature would seem to do little to assuage the security concerns of small states. 
The debate within small state theories as to whether small states are more likely to be 
passive or active in their foreign policy initiatives has also come under criticism. Not 
only can small states be seen to exhibit active policy in some areas whilst remaining 
passive in others but critics point to the effect that national style or character can have 
upon how foreign policy is handled as well as leadership differences82. Handel goes 
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further in stressing the importance of not misconstruing small state behaviour-"because 
weak states lack the strength to sanction and reward, fewer viable policy options may 
be open to them but this condition is not the same thing as passivity"83 . Claims that 
small states exhibit a greater moral slant in their foreign policy have also been the 
target of criticism. The assumption that by reason of their very smallness they are 
somehow morally superior some believe is difficult to prove. "There seems little 
evidence that the political initiatives of small states, however constrained, are 
characterised by a greater delicacy of scruple, or perceptibly more prudence, than 
those of greater neighbours"84. Evidence of involvement in international organisations 
is in itself not enough to prove a moralistic stance as the benefits of such involvement 
for small states have already been ascertained. Thus the selflessness one could read 
into this participation is doubtful. Similarly questionable is the assumption that small 
states are more peace-loving than their larger counterparts. Their tendency to avoid 
conflict could be largely in part due to military shortfalls and the costs involved rather 
than due to moral considerations85. There are however recorded incidents of small 
states aggressing against other small states indicating there is not necessarily any 
correlation between small size, relative power and aggression86. 
Other criticisms of small state theories are broader in nature concentrating on the very 
limitations of the model itself. The behaviour of small states, and in fact of any state, 
theorists such as Vital maintain is modified by many factors such as the level of 
economic and social development, the chance effects of geographical proximity to 
areas of conflict, their importance between and to great powers, the nature of their 
environment and the cohesion of the population87. Thakur claims in small state 
theories there is "not enough incorporation of the size factor into a dynamic theoretical 
model which integrates difterent explanatoryva1iables with precise weighting's and 
specified relationships"88. As such he believes small state theories of foreign policy 
have by nature difficulty coping with difference and diversity. Small state theories are 
criticised for not taking into account other variables or levels of analysis. "Although 
for the purpose of study and analysis it is desirable to isolate and to examine 
individually each of the influences on foreign policy-making, none in practice operates 
in isolation from any other"89. East, Salmore and Hermann stress the need to take into 
account other theoretical perspectives as it is aspects such as the regime and the 
perceptions of the individuals involved which mediate the relationship between 
national attributes and foreign policy behaviour90. It is necessary therefore to 
recognise the interaction between variables and how these aftect the relationship 
between the perspective under study and foreign policy behaviour. 
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Extending small state theories 
These criticisms would suggest that small state theories need to be extended to include 
variables from other perspectives, if they are to remain a valid tool in the study of 
foreign policy. It would be necessary therefore to adopt a model which, whilst 
maintaining the focus of analysis on the capacity of a state to act, acknowledges the 
variables which mediate the relationship between this and foreign policy behaviour. 
Such an approach would examine the impact of mediating or contextual variables, 
such as the properties of the international system, aspects of the regime, personal 
characteristics of political leaders, and historical, cultural and geographical 
perspectives upon the capacity to act. As such it would introduce variables from other 
perspectives and acknowledge how these may interact with, and hence alter, the 
capacity to act, and subsequent foreign policy behaviour exhibited. 
The question to be addressed therefore is the relevance of continuing to apply 
traditional small state theories to the study of New Zealand foreign policy. To do so in 
the context of this study will enable the assumptions of the model to be tested as well 
as an assessment of the validity of the alternative approach, aimed at meeting the 
criticisms levelled at traditional small state theories. To take into account the criticisms 
based on the changing international environment it shall be necessary to make the 
study broad in its time frame to ascertain if, as critics claim, over time the model has 
become increasingly obsolete. New Zealand as the small state to be utilised in this 
study is also well positioned in that, although maintaining close links with Europe and 
the rest of the Western world, geographically the distance is great thus the usefulness 
of applying small state models to more diverse geographic areas can also be tested. As 
New Zealand appears to meet the characteristics small state theories prescribe an 
examination over time of how well their predictions can be seen to correspond to its 
foreign policy behaviour will help to provide a clear indication of their continued 
viability and usefulness. 
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NEW ZEALAND FOREIGN POLICY AND SMALL STATE THEORIES 1944-
1954 
World War Two was for New Zealand an important turning point both with regards to 
threat perception and the formulation of its foreign policy. It is necessary therefore to 
begin an examination of this ten year period by outlining the unique position it found 
itself in at the beginning of 1944. Although exhibiting a budding independence in 
foreign affairs New Zealand was up until this point a loyal member of the British 
Commonwealth and as such had little problem reconciling its foreign policy with that 
of Britain. Not only did it still regard itself as essentially a European country due to 
racial, political and cultural traditions but "New Zealand's independence of action in 
foreign policy was necessarily restricted by defence commitments and trade 
arrangements withBritain"1. It had been during the war, and continued to be, Britain's 
loyal ally enjoying almost exclusive economic, political and defence links. This 
continuing identification and the strong ties it fostered manifested itself in a 
preoccupation with events in Europe and the view that any threat to the United 
Kingdom would be seen as a threat to "the centre, focus, and force of the British 
Commonwealth ofNations"2. The Commonwealth represented its primary and most 
accepted means of asserting its own national interests and as such New Zealand's 
loyalty was seen " less as a mere surrender of judgement to British leadership than as 
an attempt to win some influence in imperial affairs"3. This strong involvement was 
however a double edged sword as despite its relatively small security needs her 
Commonwealth involvement and loyalty meant that a wider strategic outlook and 
broader sense of interdependence was evident than one would expect of a country 
New Zealand's size4. New Zealand lacked the resources to adequately assess world 
events and to formulate or carry out foreign policy on such a scale and so was 
dependent upon Britain for intelligence as well as for the forum the Commonwealth 
provided which enabled its voice, albeit small, to be heard. 
In the late thirties and early forties however evidence of a growing independence had 
begun to emerge. In 1936 for example a series of decisions were made with their 
underlying basis being a firm adherence to the principles of the League of Nations but 
which did nonetheless express views at variance with the United Kingdom5. New 
Zealand, which had grown accustomed to having its voice in international affairs heard 
through its Commonwealth role, began through the League of Nations to undergo "a 
reluctant rite of passage into the community of independent states"6. It "began 
increasingly to assume the responsibility of assessing for itself the nature of its vital 
29 
interests and of pursuing them even if at some cost to the smooth conduct of the 
relationship with Britain"7. However this emerging independence should not be over-
rated. New Zealand still concentrated on Europe as the centre of both its trading and 
defence arrangements and as such was unwilling to adopt policies that expressed views 
at any great variance with those of Great Britain. "Old loyalties persisted and policy 
seldom, or with any degree of comfort, ran counter openly to the United Kingdom"8. 
However an increasing awareness of the need to develop a more independent outlook 
did in 1943 manifest itself in the formation of the Ministry of External Affairs. This 
department replaced the Imperial Affairs Section of the Prime Ministers Department 
and was charged with "assessing international developments from a New Zealand 
point of view and of working out policies which took full account of such 
developments, as well as of the country's own requirements and outlook"9.New 
diplomatic missions were also established at this time in Washington, Ottawa, 
Canberra and Moscow. These missions and the establishment of a separate department 
to deal with foreign affairs was primarily the result of a clear shift in threat perception 
undergone as a result ofits experiences during World War Two. 
The break down of the Commonwealth security system during the war and Britain's 
consequent inability to provide New Zealand with protection had left it feeling 
particularly vulnerable and isolated in the Pacific. The fear of Japan dominated its 
thinking as, until American intervention, the Japanese had advanced successfully 
through the Pacific. The attack at Pearl Harbour and the sinking of the Prince of Wales 
and Repulse, followed by the fall of Singapore made it evident that the expansionist 
Asian Empire could not be stopped by the Royal Navy alone. America moved into the 
vacuum created by Britain's inadequacy but for both Australia and New Zealand this 
did not abate the growing sense of unease as to the Japanese10. Thus New Zealand 
was forced to recognise the risks of exclusive dependence on the United Kingdom as 
well as acknowledging for the first time its fallibility. The war also highlighted the 
inadequacy of its administration's arrangements as regards communication, overseas 
representation, protection of its interests and the need to prepare for post-war 
settlements 11. It also forced New Zealand to face the realities of its situation and 
corresponding patterns of thought and planning. Its vulnerability as a small nation in 
the post-war world was evident and that, standing alone, New Zealand lacked the 
resources to either "defend herself from invasion or keep open trade routes for 
economical survival" 12. An increasing element of Pacificqconsciousness also began to 
emerge. Thus "tension was produced by the pull between old habits of thought and 
emotion and the necessities imposed by geography and the present state of world 
affairs" 13. Evidently New Zealand could no longer rely solely upon the United 
Kingdom for its defence arrangements and thus at the beginning of this period it was 
casting about for alternatives. 
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World War Two still clearly dominated the perception of threat at the outset of this 
period thus New Zealand's quest for security was seen primarily in terms of defence 
and its foreign policy reflected this. The weaknesses in its existing system of defence 
had been made clear therefore the emphasis was on strengthening its defensive 
position. Little or no emphasis was placed on other aspects of security such as stability 
in trade, an area which small state theorists highlight as being particularly vulnerable to 
external influence. New Zealand during the war had experienced a trade relationship 
with Britain which provided a guaranteed market for its goods and there was no sign 
of this arrangement changing in the near future. Thus it was defensive concerns that 
New Zealand's foreign policy was set to address at the beginning of this period. 
But to what extent do traditional small state theories aid in an understanding of the 
foreign policies New Zealand followed in this period? Small state theories 
acknowledge the inability of most small states to adequately provide for their own 
security, due to resource limitations, and cite other methods commonly utilised. 
Security through alliances or associations with more able states is one such tool, as is 
involvement in international organisations and an adherence to and support for 
international laws. Through such methods small states are able to lower the costs 
involved in providing for their defence thus are able to achieve a total expenditure that 
would normally exceed its means. Such tools or tactics do however exact costs which 
can erode a states autonomy. By examining the foreign policy initiatives New Zealand 
adopted during this period for evidence of such tactics, or the costs which may incur 
as a result of them, a conclusion can be drawn as to whether small state theories alone 
provide a useful model. 
COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
Due to the significance that small state theories attribute to international organisations 
as a means by which such states are able to exert influence, they are an important 
starting point in an examination of the foreign policy initiatives adopted by New 
Zealand in this period. As previously established small state theories highlight the 
potential benefits international laws and organisations offer. They act as tools which 
enable states with limited resources the opportunity to exert influence and pursue their 
national interests in the international arena. Within these frameworks small states can 
build coalitions and thus maximise their influence. International laws also provide 
defence against intervention that a small state may not be able to ensure for itself. 
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Considering New Zealand's already established history of espousing the principles of 
collective security the United Nations appeared, at the beginning of 1944, to be an 
obvious tool to help alleviate its security concerns. In 1944 Peter Fraser, the New 
Zealand Prime Minister, claimed: "Peace can only be maintained by a world 
organisation, on the basis of world security" 14. He went further to say that the idea of 
regional security was in itself a mirage. Considering its position as a small country with 
a global market, distant cultural roots and wide security interests a lively self-interest 
in the stability of the world order seemed the most logical means of protecting 
interests of this magnitude and thus the United Nations the most significant forum 15. 
For a small state the mechanisms of collective security also offered a potentially cost 
efficient means of having its voice heard and influence felt, as New Zealand's 
involvement in the League ofNations and the Commonwealth had proved. It's active 
involvement from the outset in the planning and formation of what was to become the 
United Nations appeared to be in recognition of these benefits but a closer examination 
of the actors involved and the initiatives embarked upon is necessary to ascertain the 
motivation behind the foreign policy. 
Discussions as to the drafting of the United Nations Charter began at Dumbarton Oaks 
in April of 1945 but only the four major allies were present: the United States, the 
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China. New Zealand had already voiced its 
concern over the lack of more general consultation through the Canberra Pact which it 
had signed with Australia. Article 14 of this agreement concerned itself with the 
establishment of an international organisation, with the desire for Australian and New 
Zealand involvement stressed 16. However upon closer examination it is clear the 
Canberra Pact was an Australian initiative and that New Zealand's involvement was 
reluctant. "The New Zealander' s had envisaged merely an exchange of opinions, noted 
down in an agreed record of proceedings: they doubted the wisdom and the 
constitutional propriety of negotiating a formal treaty'' 17. Although clearly concerned 
about the nature of the Charter being drawn up it insisted that the Australian 
proposals be either toned down in places or parts dropped before they would sign the 
Pact. Its commitment was further weakened by the steps taken to placate allies it 
believed to feel slighted by the content of the Pact. 
Once more inclusive talks did commence in San Francisco in 1945 New Zealand soon 
made its voice heard. It vigorously advocated the development of a system of global 
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security untrammelled by great power veto and argued strenuously for the rights of 
small nations 18. Unified resistance by the great powers meant it was unable to obtain 
significant modifications however at San Francisco "the New Zealand delegation 
played a useful role quite disproportionate to the country's size, or indeed to its 
previous involvement on the international scene" 19. It persevered in attempts to make 
the United Nations an effective means of ensuring collective security and condemned 
aspects it believed to be harmful to the purposes of the organisation itself Nor did 
New Zealand at the San Francisco Conference allow traditional ties to interfere with 
the principles of the Charter. The leading role it took in drafting provisions which set 
up a trusteeship system for dependent territories, with the ultimate aim of self-
government or independence, was done despite the potential embarrassment this may 
have incurred for the United Kingdom, itself still a major colonial power20. 
However the significance of Australia's partnership in these negotiations must not be 
overlooked. Many of the amendments that New Zealand fought to achieve were those 
that had been formulated by the Australians at the Canberra Conference and were 
often presented as multilateral initiatives. For example the attempts made to prevent 
the provision of a great power veto was one such initiative brought not by New 
Zealand alone but by many of the small countries involved in the Conference. It was 
also in partnership with Australia that New Zealand made proposals to strengthen the 
human rights provisions of the Charter. On the issue of trusteeship although its 
representative was the Chairman of the Committee it was Evatt of Australia who was 
"the principal mover and shaker in its meetings"21 . Thus the emphasis accorded New 
Zealand's active role should be somewhat reserved and "it must be emphasised again 
that the effectiveness of its diplomacy was greatly enhanced by its close collaboration 
with Australia, from which it differed on no significant issue"22. 
New Zealand was not unaware of the central defects the final Charter contained and 
the corresponding impact this would have upon the efficient operation of the 
organisation. By 1946 these problems were becoming evident. The lines of division 
between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union were becoming clearer and were 
threatening to render the organisation powerless, much to New Zealand's dismay. 
Thus by 1948 its expectations of the United Nations were more modest. Fraser 
reported however that: "It must be accepted with its achievements and its failures, its 
opportunities and its costs, or we must isolate ourselves from one of the main currents 
of international life"23 . New Zealand continued therefore to push for amendments that 
would render it more effective and sought to demonstrate confidence in the 
organisation by giving it responsibilities. One such initiative was the proposal that the 
United Nations be vested with sovereignty over the Italian colonies but this proposal 
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was rejected24. The rejection of this proposal was consistent with the fate of many 
proposals during this time and was evidence of the central flaw in the Charter created 
by the great power veto. Multilateral initiatives such as the 'Uniting for Peace' 
resolution of 1950 were evidence that New Zealand was not alone in this period in its 
realisation of the inadequacies of the United Nations and so was not alone in its 
attempts to bring about amendments, despite the lack of success accorded such 
endeavours25. 
New Zealand continued to support the United Nations and in so doing accepted 
responsibilities in areas beyond its immediate concern. The response to the Korean 
War for example was in line with United Nations requests and embarked upon despite 
initial reluctance. Formally to comply with United Nations requests for involvement 
New Zealand was forced to change its defence focus from the Middle East, an area it 
still considered to be a vital security concern. It was argued that it was necessary to 
demonstrate its commitment to the troubled organisation. However upon examination 
it is evident that New Zealand's decision to commit to the Korean conflict involved 
considerations that had little to do with the United Nations. The request for 
involvement, being an American lead initiative, presented it with a difficult diplomatic 
situation in its wish to please both the United Kingdom which was hesitant and the 
United States which it was attempting to commit to the South Pacific area. The British 
position, shaped by its vested interests in Hong Kong and the fear of renewed civil war 
in China, was such that it was hesitant to adopt a policy as militantly anti-China as the 
United States advocated26. New Zealand was not prepared to move independently of 
Britain out ofloyalty as well as its own fears of a larger war developing, yet was also 
aware of the advantages that such a commitment would garner in terms of establishing 
itself as a useful American ally. The Australians had seized upon this opportunity and 
announced their commitment almost immediately thus increasing the pressure on New 
Zealand to bring its policy back in line with its primary partner on South Pacific issues. 
Eventually the matter was resolved when the British and Americans came to their own 
agreement whereupon New Zealand felt less hesitant in announcing its support of the 
Americans. Whereas Australia "perceived an unusual constellation of circumstances 
and took firm and prompt action to seize the initiative" New Zealand remained 
reluctant to adopt a policy contrary to its traditional ally despite the clear benefits that 
the situation presented27. Therefore although its decision to send troops to Korea 
appeared to be in line with its commitment to the United Nations the final decision had 
little to do with the organisation. 
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Before becoming involved in the Indo-China crisis New Zealand also sought United 
Nations endorsement of the American call for united action. However this initiative 
was motivated by reasons unconnected to the organisation itself Again it was 
attempting to stall making a commitment as it not only shared British concerns as to 
American intentions but was reluctant to become involved in the wider Asian-Pacific 
region. The Australian's, aware of their vulnerability in that they lay "on the natural 
line of Communist advance through Southeast Asia" were quick to contribute28. Thus 
New Zealand's hesitancy to answer the American call for action was again potentially 
jeopardising its bargaining position vis-a-vis the possibility of a Pacific Treaty with the 
Americans, where the Australians had been seen to take the initiative. The New 
Zealand government found itself"caught between the wish for security tempered by 
caution about involvement and the wish to gain a United States commitment without 
angering the British"29. The achievement of a settlement at Geneva ruling out direct 
intervention made it possible for the British and Americans to move forward jointly 
with the organisation of collective defence in the region. New Zealand did therefore 
commit itself to sending troops to South-east Asia but not out of a sense of duty to the 
United Nations. Despite its concerns as to involvement in Asia it capitulated under 
pressure, both direct and indirect, applied by the United States and Australia. However 
New Zealand by jockeying between its two major allies was successful in avoiding a 
formal commitment until a resolution was reached between the two, evidence of the 
potential manoeuvrability afforded smaller states. 
New Zealand's commitment to the United Nations and its stance on regional security 
systems began to alter as the potential it had envisaged for the United Nations at San 
Francisco became increasingly unlikely to eventuate. Where four years early it had 
fought to have anti-regionalism included in the Charter, in 1949 it acknowledged that 
regional arrangements such as the Atlantic Pact were essential in certain circumstances 
and justifiable as long as they did not represent a threat to any peace-loving state or an 
excuse for non-participation in the United Nations30. Whereas Australia, who in its 
involvement in the drafting of Chapter 8 of the Charter, had acknowledged the need 
for regional arrangements to ensure security and had envisaged such an arrangement in 
the Pacific, New Zealand was hesitant to do so. It was not until both its major allies 
signed the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) of 1949 that it was prepared to announce its 
acceptance of such arrangements and voiced its interest in a similar arrangement for 
the South Pacific. Yet again New Zealand's foreign policy direction demonstrated a 
lack of real initiative in that it was responding to the foreign policy moves of those 
significant to it. 
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Throughout this period therefore there appears a continuity to New Zealand's record 
of conscientious commitment to the principles of collective security that would seem 
to validate small state theorists claims as to the advantages they offer. As the 
theoretical literature on small states established, this commitment seemed to be 
motivated both by principle and pragmatism. "Like other small states, there was a 
transparency to New Zealand's concern to see state behaviour adhere to the rules and 
principles of conduct prescribed by the United Nations Charter"31 . Although faced 
with an organisation rendered ineffective by the great power veto, the United Nations 
still represented a cost efficient means by which a small state such as New Zealand 
could exert its influence on a wider scale and disproportionate to the actual leverage it 
possessed. Its attempts to strengthen the United Nations and the protection it was able 
to offer a state under threat were therefore consistent with its position as a small state. 
The Australian influence on New Zealand's policy as regards collective security cannot 
be overlooked however. It was essentially Australian proposals that it fought to 
include in the United Nations Charter and this was often done in partnership with, or 
under Australian leadership as well in concert with other small states. The hesitancy it 
exhibited in becoming involved in both the Korean War and the Indo-china crisis is 
evidence of its support for the United Nations being dependent upon its agenda as 
regards America and Britain. Further, once NATO was signed, New Zealand was 
prepared to move its emphasis from the United Nations to the development of regional 
arrangements. It seems therefore that in this ten year period its level of commitment to 
the United Nations was dependent upon factors beyond those relating to size. The 
wishes of its allies, its post-World War Two insecurities and international trends were 
all factors in the formulation of New Zealand's foreign policy where the United 
Nations was concerned. 
THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH 
The Commonwealth at the beginning of this period offered New Zealand an alliance of 
the nature small state theorists contend provide weak states with the ability to provide 
for their security whilst offsetting the costs incurred. Despite the benefits of these 
alliances or associations small state theories emphasis the possible negative aspects 
such as the commitment that may be required to conflicts beyond a small states 
regional area of concern and the defence planning involved that may prove 
inappropriate to its needs. The costs involved, whilst initially appearing to lessen in 
alliance, may in terms of the commitment required and the loss of autonomy that can 
result, prove to be great. To ascertain whether New Zealand experienced such costs in 
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its involvement in the Commonwealth an examination of the course of events and the 
commitments expected of it must be made. 
The Commonwealth had in the past, and still did offer New Zealand an already 
established and well-tried means of voicing its security concerns as well as providing 
actual security arrangements, despite the weaknesses that had become evident. Prior to 
World War Two the Commonwealth represented New Zealand's primary means of 
providing for its security and all its forces were equipped and trained in a manner 
consistent with the rest of the Commonwealth. During the war the Commonwealth 
connection gained it a seat on the Pacific War Council and it was from Britain that it 
received much ofits intelligence. Despite its involvement in the League of Nations 
New Zealand "upheld the view that in foreign affairs the Empire should be regarded as 
a unit and that ideally, it should speak with one voice"32. In the post-war world of 
clear divisions between east and west and super power domination the 
Commonwealth, and Britain, offered New Zealand influence indirectly which it could 
not hope to attain standing alone. Also implicit in the arrangement were assurances of 
protection should its security be threatened. However by 1944 it was clear the 
Commonwealth security system had broken down and "in a situation where Britain 
herself was so dependent on the United States for achieving her own security and 
prosperity goals, New Zealand could hardly look to Britain as in the pre-war days as 
virtually the sole guarantor of her security and prosperity"33. A lack of 
Commonwealth solidarity in Pacific matters was also evident yet as the flaws in the 
United Nations emerged it was faced with little other option than to continue to 
develop its defence policy within the British Commonwealth framework. "The New 
Zealand Chiefs of Staff then, while paying court to the possibility of some future new 
world-wide system under the United Nations, thought primarily in traditional terms of 
working through 'Imperial Defence' ... "34. The security arrangements New Zealand 
experienced through membership in the Commonwealth were however consistent it 
believed with the United Nations Charter and thus did not represent any breach in its 
commitment to the organisation. 
Thus at the beginning of this period old loyalties were seen to persist and New Zealand 
foreign policy continued to be shaped by its Commonwealth membership. It was 
reluctant to accept any international involvement in an individual capacity and thus 
often participated as a member of the British Empire. It's role in the occupation of 
Japan was the first of such commitments in this period made through Commonwealth 
channels which whilst incurring some costs was primarily embarked upon out of self-
interest. Not only was it seen to be both important to the 'team' and diplomatically 
advantageous but due to the fears fostered during the war New Zealand had a very 
real interest in having its voice and presence felt in Japan35. Thus through the 
Commonwealth it was able to exert influence. 
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New Zealand's continuing commitment to the defence of the Middle East was also due 
to Commonwealth affiliations even though both during and after World War Two the 
Pacific area was clearly far more significant to New Zealand's defence than it had 
previously been. As the Cold War developed and the fear of Communism grew, its 
continuing preoccupation with events in Europe was evident. It continued to identify 
with Britain in assessing international developments and its security commitments 
reflected this Euro-centric bias. It had a standing force in the Middle East and as part 
of the Commonwealth it supported the Colombo Plan of 1950 which was designed to 
halt the spread of communism by improving living standards36. This deployment 
represented the bulk of New Zealand's scant defence forces and thus left its ability to 
undertake commitment elsewhere limited. The reluctance it exhibited in contributing to 
the United Nations force in Korea was in part due to its unwillingness to withdraw this 
deployment which it believed to be an essential Commonwealth commitment. This was 
despite the fact that Britain had since 1946 reduced its responsibilities abroad and was 
encouraging the Dominions to take responsibility for their own defence. Clearly New 
Zealand still perceived the defence of Britain and the Commonwealth to be essential to 
its own security thus the commitment to the Middle East was undertaken willingly. 
This posting in the Middle East continued throughout the period and was only 
withdrawn as a result of the Korean War once British approval was secured. Despite 
this withdrawal New Zealand continued to be committed to the region pledging in 
1951 to send 35,000 troops to the Middle East should a major war break out37. 
Despite early reluctance due to its commitment in the Middle East New Zealand's 
contribution to the Korean War was also within a Commonwealth framework and, as 
established, British approval was secured before any deployment was made. Although 
sympathetic to the British position advocating conciliatory measures towards China, 
the potential for divergence between Britain and New Zealand on this issue existed. 
Earlier it had been at odds with the United Kingdom over the recognition of China 
within which Britain had major investments. "New Zealand's refusal to recognise at 
this time linked it to the newly elected conservative government in Australia, to the 
United States and to the anti~Communist regimes in Asia"38. However New Zealand 
remained wary of supporting the more forceful American approach to the conflict. As 
established, this divergence was reconciled not through any initiative adopted by New 
Zealand rather it was solved when an Anglo~American compromise was reached. This 
prevented it from having to separate itself publicly from the Commonwealth whilst 
enabling it to remain in favour with both Australia and America with whom it was 
involved in delicate negotiations over the Pacific question. However the cost thus 
incurred was the removal of New Zealand's troops from the Middle East, an area it 
was reluctant to leave, and its embroilment in the Asian region something it had been 
keen to avoid. 
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The war in Indo-China proved similarly difficult for New Zealand diplomatically. For 
reasons of its own as well as its Commonwealth ties it again hesitated to become 
involved when the American call for intervention was made. New Zealand found itself 
caught between the desire to establish itself as a valuable American ally and the wish 
to maintain a position consistent with that of the British. However there is clear 
evidence of self-interest in its desire to avoid commitment that went beyond mere 
loyalty to the Commonwealth. New Zealand had long voiced its concerns as regards 
involvement in the wider Asian Pacific region and thus its reluctance due to supposed 
Commonwealth allegiance must be queried especially timed as it was just after the 
conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty which excluded Britain. 
However all was not entirely well as early cracks in New Zealand's relationship with 
the Commonwealth did develop and there is evidence of careful management of the 
association throughout. The Canberra Pact signed between New Zealand and Australia 
in 1944 displeased Britain as it felt its voice alone at the Dumbarton Oaks talks on 
post-war arrangements was adequate to voice the concerns of the two Dominions. The 
British considered the Pact to be a "deplorable monument of egregious amateurism in 
international affairs" and felt slighted by references to the question of trusteeship in the 
Pacific which was again brought up at the 1945 Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
meeting39. New Zealand had wanted a united position from the Commonwealth on 
the subject but acknowledging this was not a likelihood, Fraser announced that on this 
issue it would reserve the right to its own opinion 40.The impact of the Canberra Pact 
was not as harmful to the Commonwealth relationship as some feared in that openly 
this disagreement was afforded little attention and New Zealand was quick to respond 
to Britain's concerns by stressing that it was not directed at any one country and that 
the purpose of it would be defeated if Britain believed this to be so 41 . If one examines 
the dominance of Australia in the formation of the Pact and New Zealand's hesitancy 
in formalising it, it is clear that the initiative was an Australian one rather than a joint 
arrangement. In its attempts to reassure all existing and potential partners as to its 
intentions there appears further evidence of the lack of real commitment. 
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The negotiation and signing of the ANZUS Treaty also proved to be a stress on the 
Commonwealth relationship. Although New Zealand did so with British consultation 
and in the belief that it would free itself through such a Treaty to play a full part in 
Commonwealth defence the British were not satisfled42. New Zealand envisaged a 
pattern such as had been evident in World War Two whereby the United States would 
defend the Pacific leaving it free to fight with Britain in the Middle East and remain 
loyal to other Commonwealth commitments. Britain however wished to be a signatory 
as it felt its strong interests in the Pacific entitled it to a place, especially in view of the 
assumed Commonwealth commitment to the defence of Australia and New Zealand43 . 
The Americans were nevertheless anti British inclusion for fear the pact would become 
too enlarged and both the Australians and the New Zealanders were reluctant to push 
for British involvement. However at the negotiations New Zealand, whilst aware of 
the advantages of an American guarantee in the Pacific, clearly demonstrated a limited 
interest in a treaty claiming a "presidential declaration, preferably with Congressional 
approval" would have been acceptable 44. It was not only wary of wider commitments 
in the area but "the prospect of the United States becoming more important and the 
British less so in New Zealand's affairs was not one that either public opinion or 
policy-makers welcomed"45. Whereas the Australian's perceived the opportunity 
presented by the Korean War, and the corresponding change in the American focus on 
Pacific issues as shall be discussed further, and seized the initiative New Zealand was 
reluctant to do so. It "found it more difficult than Australia to contemplate a Pacific 
security arrangement which did not include Britain"46. The resulting ANWS Treaty 
therefore represents New Zealand's eventual capitulation to Australian and American 
desires rather than an initiative adopted by it. Thus it was tied into a treaty which 
opened it to charges of disloyalty to the Commonwealth, which were not reconciled 
until the signing of SEATO, the implications of which shall be discussed. 
Throughout this period therefore the Commonwealth offered New Zealand the 
advantages small state theories associate with such alliances. It achieved within its 
boundaries the means to alleviate some of its security concerns through the 
Commonwealth commitment to defend its territory and the training of its troops and 
supply of equipment. Although aware of the weaknesses of the Commonwealth as a 
result of World War Two it still presented New Zealand with a cost efficient means of 
providing for its defence particularly in the light of the obvious failures of the United 
Nations. At times the alliance required careful management when its foreign policy 
direction diverged from that of Britain's but these were often concluded with little or 
no real consequences being felt. As regards the costs associated with such alliances 
New Zealand was involved in several conflicts due to Commonwealth initiatives. 
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However on closer examination there were often benefits gained from these 
commitments that would otherwise not have been achieved or ulterior motives behind 
its desire to have Commonwealth involvement secured. Thus the real cost to New 
Zealand of its involvement in the Commonwealth does not appear high. Its autonomy 
was not impinged upon significantly by the alliance, as the negotiation of ANZUS 
proved, while it felt free to cite the Commonwealth as an excuse not to participate, or 
to stall a decision, when it suited. By examining the wider international political 
environment, the position Britain was in and the emerging East-West divide the 
manuoeverablity and leverage New Zealand was seen to achieve in this period can be 
explained in a way small state theories alone fail to do. 
REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS 
Small states, due to the resource limitations they face, often tend to have a narrow 
focus in their foreign policy initiatives. This, according to theorists, enables them to 
concentrate their scarce resources on the areas of greatest concern and thus maximise 
their effectiveness. Within this narrow focus initiatives embarked upon are often 
multilateral or co-operative to offset the constraints faced individually. Evidence of 
careful management of foreign policy to minimise risks and avoid angering or 
alienating important allies is also a characteristic attributed to small states which act to 
reduce the impact of policy failure. Small states therefore often utilise certain tools 
which carry with them less in the way of costs and have a narrow foreign policy focus 
which enables a concentration of resources on the areas of most concern. New 
Zealand due to its historical ties and through the Commonwealth connection had 
previously experienced a wide foreign policy focus. However World War Two had 
clearly exhibited the necessity for it to become more aware of the geographical 
realities of its position. Thus an examination must be made of the regional initiatives 
adopted by New Zealand in this period for evidence of a narrowing of focus as well as 
the utilisation of the tools small state theorists believe characterise such states. 
It was through a sense of necessity that, despite New Zealand's continuing suspicion 
of regional arrangements, it began to acknowledge their place in the post-war 
environment and even seek out involvement during this ten year period. The United 
Nations which had for New Zealand held such promise was, due to the excessive 
authority conferred on the great powers, fatally flawed and so even from the outset an 
element of uncertainty as regards its operation was introduced. It was clear that the 
two hostile camps of the post-war world were making universality impossible and 
hobbling the United Nations functions. "For small states such as New Zealand, these 
conditions inhibited the scope for manoeuvre and coalition in the United Nations 
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through ideological and political polarisation' s increasingly embedded within 
competing alliance and security complexes"47. By 1949, in accepting the North 
Atlantic Treaty, it acknowledged the necessity of establishing for defence separate and 
limited systems of collective security as long as they were seen to be consistent with 
United Nations principles. Thus once a precedent was set by its allies it was prepared 
to accept, and even seek out regional arrangements, a move that represented a 
considerable shift in its policy and which was only adopted once the international trend 
had been established. 
Its realisation of the increasing necessity for regional security arrangements was 
further enforced by the breakdown of the Commonwealth defence system as already 
outlined and the vacuum this left in the Pacific. New Zealand due to the events of 
World War Two with particular reference to the initial success of the Japanese 
advance, the attack on Pearl Harbour and the inadequacy of the British Navy was 
slowly developing a 'Paciflc-consciousness'48. American initiatives to win Japan as an 
ally in the emerging Cold War through negotiating a 'peace of reconciliation' did 
nothing to allay its fears of a resurgent Japan and fell far short of the repressive treaty 
it was advocating49. New Zealand had been forced into acknowledging the 
geographical realities of its position and the problems created by its isolation. Its focus 
therefore turned to the waters immediately surrounding it and the wider South Pacific 
area. Little thought was given within this to the individual Pacific Islands rather it was 
the vulnerability New Zealand experienced due to its isolation and distance from any 
of its major allies. Australia therefore became an important focus as did the 
maintenance of a great power presence in the South Pacific. Attempts to provide for 
its security by economically strengthening or helping to maintain the political stability 
of the small states in the region was not considered at the time although such a policy 
was readily adopted in Eastern Europe to halt the spread of Communism. These fears 
therefore dominated New Zealand's post-war defence thinking and it became evident 
that they necessitated a rethink of its defence planning. 
The desire increasingly to have its voice heard also began pushing New Zealand in the 
direction of regional arrangements. During the war New Zealand had pressed, 
primarily through the Commonwealth, for a right to share in policy-making and 
fighting in the Pacific. However the Cairo Declaration of 1943 which dealt with post-
war arrangements for the Pacific region had been concluded without New Zealand 
involvement or input50. This did not bode well when taken in light of the discussions 
at Dumbarton Oaks which had also included talks regarding the Pacific and Japan's 
post-war treatment. New Zealand as a small state was clearly finding it increasingly 
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difficult to have its voice heard and thus began to look to its immediate neighbour 
Australia, who was also keenly aware of the need to establish a claim and voice in the 
future of the Pacific. In 1943 New Zealand had established an embassy in Canberra 
and discussions as to possible actions began. 
The Canberra Pact and Pacific ifniolvement 
It was from such diverse influences therefore that New Zealand began, albeit it 
reluctantly, to develop during this period regional arrangements the first of which was 
the Canberra Pact signed with Australia. Not only did this represent New Zealand's 
first approach to regionalism but it was the first published evidence of a new era of 
'Pacific-awareness'51 . The primary motivational factor in getting the talks underway 
which were to become the precursor to the Pact was concern from both parties over 
the terms of the Cairo Declaration of 1943. Both New Zealand and Australia were 
apprehensive over the plans produced as to the disposal of Pacific territories after the 
war and the proposals for American bases. Both felt that their experience, war efforts 
and vital interests entitled them to a say in the control and destiny of the South Pacific 
area and were anxious for a voice in any future discussions at the highest level 52. In 
signing the Pact New Zealand and Australia announced their intention to act and speak 
together internationally and to collaborate in maintaining South Pacific security 
through the creation of a regional security zone. "The pact was an indication that the 
two Dominions wished to be less dependent on the views of both Britain and America 
in the Pacific"53 . However New Zealand had arrived in Canberra expecting to take 
part in talks only and was disturbed when presented with a draft of what was to 
become the Canberra Pact. As established New Zealand questioned the wisdom of 
such a formal arrangement and sought to make alterations before it would sign out of 
anxiety as to possible reactions. Clearly whilst aware of its very real concerns in the 
area it was still hesitant to make a stand that could endanger its traditional security 
arrangements. 
New Zealand's concerns appeared to be justified as the Canberra Pact was met with 
immediate disapproval both from America and Britain. The Americans regarded it "as 
an ungrateful and somewhat impudent attempt to exclude America from the South 
Pacific" whereas the British felt slighted by the lack of faith its Dominions had placed 
in it as regards negotiating a Charter which addressed their concems54. However the 
implications and consequences of the Canberra Pact should not be over-rated. The 
potential clash between such an arrangement and New Zealand's aspirations as regards 
continued American involvement in the Pacific was evident. New Zealand sought 
therefore to reassure the Americans by stressing the essential role it saw for America 
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in security and development aspects in the South-west Pacific and by officially 
recognising American claims to various Pacific islands. The lack of any real impact 
also served to placate both Britain and America. When the Potsdam Conference 
concluded for example the Dominions were presented with a 'fait accompli' as regards 
post-war Pacific arrangements55. New Zealand also actively sought to reassure the 
British a move Australia was reluctant to adopt. The Canberra Pact therefore, whilst 
"evidence that Australia in particular intended to take vigorous initiatives in pressing 
publicly views on post-war settlements without much regard to the susceptibilities of 
its greatest/closest allies", cannot be construed as representing the same for New 
Zealand 56. Its involvement was far more conditional and under clear Australian 
leadership as were its actions at the San Francisco Conference that followed. Claims 
that the Canberra Pact represented an increasing national maturity, independence of 
mind and intention of pursuing policy in the Pacific "intelligible in terms not of 
subordination to British hesitations and abstractions, but of the strategic needs, 
enlightened self-interest, and duty to Polynesian peoples of a quite independent 
power ... " perhaps add more weight to the Pact than there was in reality5 7. Similarly 
New Zealand's involvement in the United Nations, in Korea and in negotiations with 
America over ANZUS were all either in partnership with Australia or under its 
leadership as shall be examined thus bringing in to question which if any represented 
initiatives on New Zealand's behalf as opposed to the following of Australia's lead. 
Coupled with the Canberra Pact New Zealand was involved in several other 
organisations that had as their primary aim the economic and social development of 
the immediate region. As these were undertaken as a means of creating a stable and 
secure environment they fall within the category of security arrangements. It came to 
realise the long-term security advantages of a concern for the welfare of native peoples 
in the Pacific and Asia and their economic, social and political development as poverty 
and misery were clear seedbeds of revolution and war58. In 1946 New Zealand as a 
member of the United Nations Council participated in the work of the Children,s Fund 
(UNICEF) and in 1950 was part of the Colombo Plan which was concerned with 
economic development in South and South East Asia. The South Pacific Commission 
established in 1947 had a similar intent but was focused exclusively on the Pacific 
region although it included as signatories the United Kingdom, the United States and 
France. Such endeavours were not wholly altruistic as for New Zealand they offered a 
means of providing for a more secure environment that incurred little in the way of 
actual physical costs or commitments. However upon examination it appears none of 
these initiatives were by New Zealand's design and clearly represented a following of 
the policies of its allies or of international trends. Its contribution to the Colombo Plan 
44 
for example was through the Commonwealth and was a direct response to fears about 
the spread of Communism, a concern far removed from the geographical realities of its 
position. The South Pacific Commission was similar in design and, although closer 
geographically to New Zealand, it was only embarked upon with both American and 
British involvement. Thus its actions again may illustrate little more than a desire to 
follow the policies adopted by its major atlies and so the significance of its involvement 
should not be misconstrued as an active foreign policy initiative. 
The Securing of an American Commitment 
Initially following the conclusion ofWorld War Two it seemed to New Zealand that 
the much needed American presence in the Pacific would continue. The United States 
appetite for bases in the Pacific was very public and "New Zealand joined with Britain 
and Australia in trying to use the island bases as bargaining counters to get the United 
States to join in a regional security alliance in the South Pacific"59. However as the 
need for a quick peace settlement with Japan became more pressing America's interest 
in the South Pacific faded. American anti-regionalism was also an issue especially in an 
area it believed to lack a common civilisation, community of interest and real trust 
between its diverse countries60. This American reluctance to further its involvement in 
the Pacific compounded New Zealand's new found sense of insecurity and fear of a 
resurgent Japan. The United States however were pushing ahead with their 
negotiations of a peace treaty with Japan which contained none of the restrictions New 
Zealand favoured. The Americans were willing to acknowledge these fears but would 
only offer informal, general assurances to allay them. Its problem "accordingly was to 
persuade the Americans to take precautions against a danger which they rated low and 
against which protection could not be offered by a United Nations paralysed by the 
Cold W ar"61 . 
New Zealand saw the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty as a precedent for a similar 
arrangement in the Pacific and the drive and persistence demonstrated in its demands 
for security guarantees from America against Japan represented a major diplomatic 
effort62. The growing fear of communism gave both New Zealand and Australia their 
first opportunity to exert some influence. The United States pushed harder in its 
efforts to normalise relations between Japan and the West as a means of creating in 
Japan a bulwark against the spread of communism which with the victory in China 
seemed a very real threat. New Zealand and Australia began preliminary discussions 
and sought to agree on an approach to the peace treaty with Japan which would 
include some degree of an American guarantee in the Pacific. However there were 
limitations as to the extent of agreement that could be reached between the two on 
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Pacific security as New Zealand remained anti British exclusion or an agreement that 
could mean new commitments63 . Eventually New Zealand capitulated "in the face of 
the determination of the Australian delegation to achieve a common front" at any 
negotiations that took place64. Thus it was the Australians that persuaded it to 
develop a joint policy which linked the acceptance of any peace treaty with Japan to a 
security arrangement with the Americans in the Pacific. But still the Americans were 
reluctant. 
The outbreak of the Korean War was for New Zealand and Australia fortuitous in that 
it had a two-fold effect on the negotiations. The United States was forced to alter its 
perceptions as to the area of principal Communist threat and correspondingly 
upgraded its concern in Asia and the Pacific65. Australia's quick response to the 
American sponsored United Nations request for assistance created goodwill in 
establishing it as a valuable ally and gave it further leverage with the United States 
which it was quick to exploit. New Zealand as we have seen was not as quick to offer 
its support as it remained hesitant of a wider commitment as well as of separating itself 
from the British position. "In short, a Pacific pact in the particular form of the ANZUS 
Treaty became for the first time negotiable against the background of, first, American 
pressure for an early and general peace treaty with Japan, and, secondly, military aid 
readily and swiftly given by Australia during the Korean War''66. In these conditions 
Australia, with New Zealand, was able therefore to secure a tripartite defence 
agreement in the form of the ANZUS treaty which met with both of their defence 
requirements in the Pacific without including commitments of a wider nature in the 
region. The success afforded this initiative was largely due to factors of an 
international scale as it was the growing fear of communism that enabled New 
Zealand, in partnership with Australia, to exercise leverage in a manner small state 
theories do not account for. 
The role New Zealand adopted at the treaty negotiations is important however in 
establishing its commitment. It remained wary of becoming involved in any 
commitments through the association that would take it away from those it was 
already involved in and as established was reluctant to make the arrangement a formal 
one. Both Australia and America desired more of a commitment and thus New 
Zealand was seen to capitulate. Therefore while appearing significant in that it was 
seen to negotiate and sign a treaty without Britain the Australian role as leader and 
initiator cannot be ignored nor the obvious apprehensions evident in New Zealand's 
position. As earlier established New Zealand signed the Treaty in the firm belief that 
this arrangement would free it to discharge its defensive duties as both part of the 
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Commonwealth and as a member of the United Nations. Thus, although appearing to 
illustrate a growing Pacific~consciousness and a realistic response to its strategic 
position, ANZUS did not represent a shift of such magnitude in that New Zealand was 
still evidently thinking within traditional alliance patterns and defence planning 
elsewhere. 
The South-east Asia Collective Defence Treaty(SEATO) 
The final evidence of its involvement in regional security arrangements was in the role 
it took in the drafting of the Manila Treaty of 1954. As a response to fears of the 
spread of Communism New Zealand joined with the United States, Britain, Australia, 
France, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines in making a formal commitment to the 
defence of this area. It had traditionally been hesitant of any involvement in Asia as it 
was regarded as beyond its immediate area of security concern and this was heightened 
by Britain's initial reluctance. However as Britain warmed to the idea New Zealand 
saw it as a way of obtaining a security arrangement that included both the United 
States and Britain, something it had aimed for since the signing of ANZUS and the 
subsequent mutterings in Britain about its exclusion. In that it was only with the 
United States and the United Kingdom that New Zealand would accept involvement in 
Asia, as well as its concern to placate the British, "New Zealand's membership of the 
new pact had an undeniable imperialist echo"67. New Zealand's involvement in 
SEATO therefore is again not evidence of a real initiative rather of its desire to follow 
its allies and maintain favour internationally even though it was as a result burdened 
with a commitment it had previously been anxious to avoid. 
1944-1954: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF A SMALL STATE? 
By examining the events of these ten years and the foreign policy initiatives New 
Zealand embarked upon can the characteristics that traditional small state theories 
prescribe and the subsequent effect these are believed to have upon foreign policy 
decision-making be ascertained? New Zealand clearly showed evidence, between 
1944-1954, of the conditions that small state theories identify as characteristic. Not 
only was it dependent economically upon its trade with Britain, and later others in the 
global market, but the products it exported were limited in nature. Small state theories 
highlight the restrictions imposed by New Zealand's small home market which left 
little room for diversification and opening new markets proved to be a costly and time 
consuming pursuit. Thus when it came to trade, New Zealand experienced the 
vulnerability to adverse international trends that small state theories prescribe and as 
such was wary of unsettling traditional arrangements. The commitment throughout 
this period to Britain through Commonwealth arrangements and its attempts to allay 
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Britain's fears as to its continued loyalty despite the costs incurred is evidence of this, 
particularly when the Commonwealth had exhibited such clear shortfalls in meeting its 
requirements during World War Two. However due to its recent experiences during 
World War Two, it was physical security not trade that dominated the foreign policy 
focus. Small state theories stress economic preoccupation in the foreign policy of such 
states yet in this period the wider international environment was seen to impact upon 
New Zealand's perception of threat. Theories that stress the significance of context on 
foreign policy formulation and the impact of interdependence would therefore explain 
this anomaly. 
With regard to its security arrangements in this ten year period a similar pattern is 
evident. World War Two had emphasised its inability to physically defend itself and 
this coupled with the isolation it experienced made its sense of vulnerability even 
greater. As commonly experienced in small states, New Zealand was faced with 
limited human and material resources that compounded its inability to defend its own 
territory. Throughout this period therefore it was involved in a series of external 
arrangements designed to alleviate this insecurity and provide a cost efficient means of 
providing for its defence arrangements just as small state theories of foreign policy 
prescribe. New Zealand's continuing commitment to the British Commonwealth 
during this period was evidence of this foreign policy strategy as through its 
involvement it gained a security guarantee as well as training and equipment. Small 
state theories however maintain that such alliances carry with them costs which act to 
impede the autonomy of the weaker state in the alliance. Evidence of this is not so 
clear in New Zealand's Commonwealth security relationship. Admittedly it was 
through Commonwealth arrangements that it remained committed to defence in the 
Middle East however as a result of its Euro-centric focus it perceived this area to be a 
continuing security risk to Britain and thus to itself The reluctance exhibited during 
the Korean War to remove these troops, even to an area closer to its own region, is 
evidence of the willingness to maintain this commitment. Its contribution to both 
Korea and Indo-China was also through a Commonwealth force and was embarked 
upon reluctantly. However this was not due to an unwillingness to accept its 
Commonwealth responsibilities rather it was out of concerns mirrored within the 
United Kingdom itself On both occasions New Zealand used the Commonwealth as a 
means of justifying its hesitation when it had conc,ems of its own as to involvement. It 
seems therefore that the Commonwealth incurred for New Zealand little in the way of 
actual costs and did not act to impinge upon its autonomy. Despite displeasing the 
United Kingdom over the Canberra Pact and later ANZUS few negative consequences 
were experienced. Charges of disloyalty were made but no punishment exacted. New 
Zealand did however sign SEATO, and in so doing took on wider responsibilities in 
the Asian Pacific region, as a means of having both of its major allies tied together 
through one alliance, an endeavour it had been unable to achieve at the ANZUS 
negotiations. 
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New Zealand's postwcolonial status and its continued close relationship with the 
United Kingdom did however impact upon its foreign policy in ways small state 
theories fail to account for. The Commonwealth fostered in it a broader sense of 
interdependence, resulting in a wider international focus than small state theories 
predict. Continued post-colonial ties also proved advantageous in rising above the 
constraints small state theorists base their propositions upon. The Commonwealth 
forum gave New Zealand a voice internationally whilst the United Kingdom provided 
it with intelligence information and a guaranteed a market for its produce. This freed it 
from the problems associated with a lack of adequate information gathering as well as 
the economic preoccupation that small state theorists propose. Thus factors beyond 
size, namely New Zealand's historical ties, were instrumental in alleviating the 
constraints it faced and therefore interacted in the formulation of its foreign policy. 
The ANWS Treaty also represents an alliance of the nature small state theorists 
believe characterise attempts to achieve security goals. It offered New Zealand the 
security guarantee it desired in the Pacific without involving it in any wider 
commitment. The motivation behind the alliance was the position of isolation and 
vulnerability it found itself in following World War Two. Here the significance ofNew 
Zealand's geographical location and large marine territory were clearly evident in the 
formulation of its foreign policy. Throughout the ANZUS negotiations evidence of its 
reluctance to anger the British or to become involved in the wider Pacific region 
appear to validate small state theories as to the management tactics such states utilise. 
The eventual New Zealand capitulation to both Australian and American wishes as 
regards British exclusion is clear evidence of the lose of autonomy felt once it entered 
negotiations as is the commitment that it made to lndo-China under pressure to 
demonstrate its commitment to the newly signed Treaty. The signing of SEATO, 
which included its two major alliance partners and in so doing joined the two in their 
commitment to New Zealand's security, clearly incurred costs that it was unwilling to 
undertake but that in the circumstances appeared to be justified. 
Thus its independence of action was during this period somewhat restricted by defence 
commitments and trade arrangements, initially with Britain alone and later with the 
United States, as small state theories predict. New Zealand was obliged through these 
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alliances to commit its resources, albeit scarce in nature, globally despite the realities 
of its geographical position and its commitments to both of these powerful allies did 
on occasion clash. While remaining economically dependent on the United Kingdom, 
New Zealand was increasingly reliant upon the United States for its physical security. 
Through~out this period therefore the wish to please both of these allies dominated its 
foreign policy focus. New Zealand did however utilise this position to its advantage. It 
was seen to play its two major allies off against each other in its attempts to avoid 
commitment, as was evident in the Korean conflict as well as the war in Indo-China. 
Small state theories acknowledge that due to their very nature such states may achieve 
greater manoeuvrability than their larger counterparts but this is seen to occur only 
when external conditions permit. For example in securing the American commitment in 
the Pacific it was able to use the increasing fear of communism to its advantage. To 
understand the foreign policy adopted in this period therefore it is necessary to 
introduce variables from other perspectives and levels of analysis. 
With regard to the costs that small state theories believe accompany such alliances 
New Zealand appears to have avoided significant erosion of its autonomy as during 
this period it signed both the Canberra Pact and ANZUS to Britain's displeasure but 
with no real consequences. Again therefore it is necessary to examine the wider 
context to establish how it was able to rise above the consequences traditionally 
associated with such alliances. In both of these endeavours the leadership role 
Australia adopted was significant in diffusing the response as were the conditions of 
the international arena and the emerging Cold War. When New Zealand did incur costs 
they were often accepted willingly as in the Middle East or were as a trade-off for 
.further benefits as in the signing of SEATO. However when New Zealand acted in 
partnership with Australia, who acted as an intermediary bearing the brunt of any 
displeasure its joint actions resulted in, New Zealand was subject to a considerable loss 
of autonomy as evident in the signing of the Canberra Pact and ANWS. Thus in its 
quest for security New Zealand did find itself involved in alliances and associations 
that impinged upon its autonomy yet was also able to gain some concessions due to 
external conditions that enabled it to rise above its constraints. 
Small state theories highlight the necessity for such states to carefully manage their 
foreign policy behaviour and decision-making to avoid confrontation thus minimising 
the risks and costs incurred. Evidence of an awareness of the need for careful 
diplomacy within New Zealand's foreign policy is clear during this ten year period. 
From the outset, although seeming to demonstrate increased independence, it was 
quick to reassure all its existing and potential partners of its intentions. From the 
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signing of the Canberra Pact to its negotiations with the United States over ANZUS, 
New Zealand sought to constantly reassure Britain of its loyalty and commitment to 
the Commonwealth both verbally and through its actions. It hesitated in its signing of 
the Canberra Pact out of fear of Britain's reaction and the same hesitancy was evident 
at ANZUS negotiations. Despite an earlier disagreement over the recognition of China 
New Zealand stalled the announcement of its commitment to the Korean War until the 
Commonwealth position was solidified, although clearly here an element of self-
interest played an important role. At least publicly it was only in relation to the United 
Nations that the New Zealand government articulated views at variance with the 
United Kingdom such as over trusteeship arrangements but here again the Australian 
influence can not be overlooked68. Nonetheless New Zealand did in this ten year 
period participate in two alliances, the Canberra Pact and ANZUS, which did incur the 
displeasure of Britain although its reluctance to do so was evident in the negotiations 
of both. As a direct result to the charges of disloyalty to Britain and the 
Commonwealth that these alliances provoked New Zealand signed SEATO and in so 
doing took on additional commitments in its attempts to appease the British. 
A similar pattern is evident in its relationship with the United States. New Zealand was 
quick to reassure the Americans as to the intentions outlined in the Canberra Pact and 
went so far as making important concessions on the issue of Pacific bases in its bid to 
ease their anxieties. At the Colombo Conference, where discussions over the 
recognising of Communist China took place, it argued strongly against such a move 
out of concern that by taking a position contradictory to that of the United States 
there could be negative implications for their relationship. New Zealand feared that 
such recognition would antagonise the Americans and increase their determination to 
strengthen Japan as a bulwark against communism. Over involvement in the Korean 
War it was faced with a similarly difficult diplomatic situation in its wish to please both 
the United Kingdom and the United States. It advanced carefully diplomatically until a 
Commonwealth commitment was approved whereupon it rushed to make an 
announcement so that it could be seen as ready and willing to support the Americans. 
New Zealand's contribution was also the second highest proportionately to the United 
States in a bid to be perceived as a valuable ally. 
Therefore New Zealand's foreign policy during this period can be seen to be 
dominated by the relationships with its two major allies and the careful management 
involved in maintaining both. New Zealand believed as such that "it must be prepared 
to pay the price by being willing in its tum to take Britain and American interests into 
account in formulating its own policy, even where New Zealand interests were not 
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directly involved"69. Any substantial alteration in New Zealand's foreign policy was 
seen to be contingent upon changes in either of it's major allies and the "natural 
tendency was therefore to adopt the viewpoint of our protectors" 70. Thus the system 
of alliances that New Zealand operated within between 1944-1954, whilst providing 
for its security, did imposed some behavioural restrictions just as small state theories 
predict. 
The protection offered by international law and the forums its organisations provide 
are another tool often utilised by small states according to theorists and again New 
Zealand's record during these ten years tended to follow such a pattern. The continuity 
evident in its record of conscientious commitment to the principles of collective 
security and the United Nations itself despite the obvious flaws, is a characteristic 
small state theorists recognise as representing a handy moral if not actual defence 
against intervention. In New Zealand's case this involvement began at the outset with 
a history of active participation within the League of Nations and continued through 
the forties and fifties when it consistently fought to strengthen the United Nations and 
demonstrate its confidence in the organisation. New Zealand strongly espoused the 
cause of collective security and the United Nations, believing it to be "one of the chief 
channels through which the nations, the great powers, as well as the small, express 
their foreign policies" 71 . However due to the strong leadership Australia offered New 
Zealand and the other small states at San Francisco it is difficult to ascertain which if 
any of the amendments it was seen to support were genuine initiatives on its behalf as 
opposed to Australian led initiatives. Further evidence of external influence was 
reflected in the shift towards regional arrangements that occurred during this period. 
Once the international environment began to change and the acceptance of regional 
arrangements became more widespread New Zealand also altered its focus. 
Other tools and tactics New Zealand utilised during this period in attaining, or in its 
attempts to attain, its foreign policy goals are seen to correspond with those believed 
to be peculiar to small states. Due to the lack of resources experienced in many small 
states the nature, operation and effectiveness of their diplomatic service is necessarily 
restricted. On the negative side this often results in a narrow focus and a limit in the 
policy options and means available. However theorists believe this can also prove 
advantageous in that a concentration of energy on a single issue may be possible where 
it would not be for a larger state. For New Zealand the constraints its diplomatic 
service faced were clear. New Zealand still relied upon Britain and the Commonwealth 
structure for intelligence gathering, as it lacked the man-power to do so efficiently 
itself. and the diplomatic missions that had been established were by no means 
widespread or adequately manned. This impacted upon the tactics New Zealand 
adopted therefore as they had to be within its limited capacity. 
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One such tactic New Zealand adopted was to collaborate with others as a relatively 
cost-efficient means of having its voice heard. The Canberra Pact was a clear example 
of this as were the coalitions formed within the United Nations to push for the rights 
of small states. However, as already discussed, both of these measures were afforded 
little success due to the emerging power blocs of the Cold War and New Zealand's 
reluctance to upset any of its allies. The use of persuasion and unthreatening rhetoric 
are further means available to small states which theorists recognise as typical and are 
evident in the foreign policy of New Zealand in this period. In its attempts to secure a 
voice in the Pacific it actively emphasised its Pacific identity to establish its credentials 
as a small nation with legitimate concerns in the area although this was representative 
of a tactical move rather than as evidence of greater 'Pacific mindedness' 72. Similarly 
in its attempts to secure an American commitment in the Pacific, New Zealand's chief 
tactic initially was the use of rhetoric through which it stressed the "genuine 
community of interest inherited from history, and nourished by cultural affinity as well 
as by co-operation in a crisis" 73. Such rhetoric represented a cheap means by which 
New Zealand could pursue its diplomatic goals without incurring costs or upsetting 
any present or future partners. Established forums became the venues from which New 
Zealand launched such rhetoric and was able to voice its concerns. The United Nations 
was the primary organ utilised but others such as the Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
meetings also proved useful. 
Involvement in economic or developmental arrangements was another tactic New 
Zealand utilised in this period as a cost efficient means of providing for its security. 
Corresponding with its new found awareness of its geographical realities New Zealand 
embarked upon various measures to secure its environment through developmental 
and aid programmes. These were primarily established within existing organisations 
such as the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the Canberra Pact and as such the 
costs were distributed allowing New Zealand to benefit without committing resources 
beyond its limited means. Again however it must be stressed that none of these 
organisations were created due to initiatives on New Zealand's behalf and in its 
involvement it was merely following the actions of its allies. 
Another tactic New Zealand was seen to adopt in this period, although more costly, 
was to establish goodwill through its actions and in so doing attempt to secure its 
foreign policy goals. This was most clearly evident in the decision to send troops to 
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Korea. '1The crucial determinant in Holland's mind was almost certainly the likely 
political disadvantages of a failure to support the Anglo~American lead"74. The 
pressure to make such a commitment was further increased by the actions of Australia 
who were quick to respond to the American call for support as a means of elevating 
their status as a valuable ally. 
New Zealand's involvement in SEATO represented a similar trade-off between the 
costs incurred and the potential benefits. Although anxious to avoid involvement in 
Asia, it was aware of the advantages in signing an agreement of which both of its 
major allies were signatories. In both of these cases New Zealand aware of the lack of 
leverage it wielded, was willing, to make wider commitments than would otherwise 
have been desirable to gain political concessions. This behaviour typifies that which is 
often seen in small states as they lack the resources to more actively pursue their 
foreign policy goals and so must use what little leverage they are able to obtain. The 
impetus Australia provided in heightening New Zealand's awareness of the potential 
for such manoeuvring and the subsequent pressure it applied must however detract 
from the significance that these actions can be afforded and must lead to a questioning 
of whether this is therefore evidence of the tactics small state theories prescribe. 
To its advantage New Zealand was able to utilise leverage as evident in the securing of 
the ANZUS Treaty in 1951. In light of the continuing war in Korea and the escalating 
fear of Communism New Zealand and Australia were in a position to push for the 
security requirements they desired in the Pacific. The United States looking to secure a 
peace treaty with Japan and aware that it needed the signatures of both New Zealand 
and Australia was willing therefore to accept "a regional security arrangement with the 
United States as an essential prior condition to their acceptance of any peace 
treaty" 7 5. There is an element of manoeuvrability evident here which small state 
theorists recognise as a means by which such states can temporarily offset the 
constraints that they experience. The credit for the diplomatic endeavour undertaken in 
securing this agreement must however be accorded the Australians who were 
responsible for seizing the initiative and getting negotiations underway where the New 
Zealand delegation continued to voice its reluctance. The unique relationship forged 
with Australia out of shared history and geographical proximity also acted as a buffer 
between it and its more powerful allies. 
A narrow focus in foreign affairs is another common feature brought about by the 
realities facing small states and elements of this are evident in the policies of this 
period. New Zealand continued to identify with Britain in assessing international 
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developments as well as having an economic focus with a narrow, colonial base. 
Britain was still considered to be its 'window to the world' and its security concerns 
reflected this Euro-centric bias. This continued identification meant New Zealand was 
slow to realise the need to switch its strategic interests to the Pacific and its reluctance 
to do so was evident throughout the ten year period. However through its involvement 
in the Commonwealth, its historical and economic ties as well as a history of 
participation in world affairs through international organisations its focus was wider 
than small state theorists predict. In New Zealand at this time this was manifested in "a 
wide and rather confusing gap between our security needs and our security 
interests"76. New Zealand was seen therefore to exhibit a wide foreign policy focus 
and a broad sense of interdependence that appears contrary to small state theories. 
Small state theories refer to the possibility of personal influence on policy making as 
being an issue as foreign policy units may lack the resources or machinery to achieve 
the institutionalisation evident in larger states. Due to its being modelled on the British 
system and the accessibility of information through Commonwealth channels as well as 
the United States, the New Zealand diplomatic service although small was fully 
developed. Despite this foreign policy was determined by a small group of individuals 
with almost non-existent public involvement. There is little evidence of any one 
individual dominating the process however. The change of government that occurred 
within this period would appear to back this claim as "the National governments 
emphasis on Commonwealth ties and its anti-communism were different only in degree 
from those of Labour and the National government wished, like its predecessor, to 
maintain friendship with the United States"77. 
Within small state theories, as discussed, there is some debate as to whether such 
states are more likely to be passive or active in their foreign policy initiatives. This 
debate can be seen reflected in the policy decisions taken by New Zealand in this 
period as at times it appeared to adopt an active role where in reality it was less so. Its 
apparently active role in the United Nations for example must be questioned as it was 
the Australians who put forward and lead the drive for amendments . In its signing of 
the Canberra Pact and in negotiating ANZUS New Zealand also seemed to actively 
pursue its policy in the face of great power opposition but again the Australian 
influence cannot be ignored. It hesitated in taking the initiative over a commitment to 
the Korean War despite the obvious benefits, which the Australians were quick to 
perceive and act upon. Its reluctance to commit to the wider Pacific and Asian region 
was also a consistent feature of the foreign policy of this period born out of an 
awareness of the constraints it faced rather than out of disinterest. 
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The debate as to the moral slant of small states is similarly reflected in New Zealand's 
foreign policy in this period. In practice there seems little evidence to suggest that its 
foreign policy was devised out of some sense of moral superiority. Involvement in the 
United Nations offered a forum where its voice could be heard as well as in theory 
providing for its protection if it were invaded. New Zealand's arguments for 
magnanimity in peace settlements with Germany and Italy on the grounds that "it felt 
that effects of the punishment should be such as to promote international peace and 
security" were soon forgotten when it came time to negotiate a peace settlement with 
Japan 78. Similarly in its economic and developmental policies it appears self interest 
was the deciding factor although "all this interest and activity was in line with the 
country's humanitarian tradition and attitude"79, 
In conclusion therefore whilst it did experienced the constraints that typify small states 
during this ten year period its foreign policy did not always exhibited the 
characteristics small state theories prescribe. In terms of its trade and security 
arrangements New Zealand was bound through its alliance systems to commitments 
that stretched its resources and necessitated the need for careful management. 
However in relation to the benefits received from these alliances the costs were 
relatively low and as such were not sufficient to impinge upon its independence to act 
autonomously. Where New Zealand did rise above the constraints small state theories 
focus upon it is necessary to look at the wider international environment to understand 
how this was achieved. 
In light of the lack ofindependent initiatives on New Zealand's behalf it is also difficult 
to ascertain whether its actions in this period can be attributed to theories that are 
based upon size alone. The direction of most of the policies it adopted were either set 
by the Australian precedent or can be seen to follow either one or both of its major 
allies. As such the evidence of careful management that would appear to validate small 
state claims may be evidence of New Zealand juggling the two relationships in its 
attempts to please both. At times its actions appear to be more those of a former 
colony, still unwilling to sever the ties to its motherland and the focus of its foreign 
policy would seem to support this. Any alliances that took it further from its traditional 
arrangements were embarked upon reluctantly despite the clear benefits they offered. 
Therefore small state theories that are utilised in the study of states constrained by 
limited resources but which are nonetheless independent seem, alone, to be an 
insufficient model in understanding the foreign policy of New Zealand in this period. 
An acknowledgment of its ex-colonial status would prove enlightening as would some 
reference to the international power balance at the time which was an important factor 
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in New Zealand's foreign policy direction. The difficulty it experienced in juggling its 
relations with Britain and America was as a direct result of the realisation of the 
weakened condition of the Commonwealth after the War and America's subsequent 
emergence as a major player both internationally and in the Pacific. Some attention 
must also be given to the dominance of Australia in shaping New Zealand's foreign 
policy in this period as many of the initiatives that appear to validate the application of 
small state theories were upon examination by Australia's design and under pressure 
from it to comply. Small state theories do acknowledge the need for such states to 
form alliances with more powerful states yet this relationship was particularly close 
and atypical, in that Australian clearly adopt a leadership role. Traditional small state 
theories alone therefore provide an insufficient model in understanding the foreign 
policy ofNew Zealand between 1944-1954. As critics suggest they fail to 
aclcnowledge mediating or contextual variables that, by altering the capacity to act, 
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Although nothing to the extent of the turbulence evident at the conclusion of World 
War Two, New Zealand was nonetheless faced with a rapidly changing global 
environment which, as was the case in the earlier period, forced a reassessment of 
perceived threat and the strategies adopted to counter them. Since at least the 1970's, 
it had faced a non-specific strategic environment with no readily identifiable direct 
threat or perception of threat 1. The 'domino theory' had been discredited. 
Communism had not spread and the Asia-Pacific region was fairly stable. However the 
early 1980's were characterised in both Europe and the United States by a surge in 
anti-nuclear sentiment which was felt the world over. In New Zealand this movement 
gained support and credibility as the "globally suicidal nature of nuclear weapons was 
recognised'? It became increasingly evident that threat ofinvasion in the conventional 
sense or from a traditional source was unlikely considering New Zealand's 
geographical isolation and size. Attention therefore turned to the rapid proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and the possible consequences of a nuclear war. "New Zealand's 
anti-nuclear and nationalist sentiment coincided in the recognition that nuclear war 
constituted the most significant threat to national security"3. These concerns were 
assimilated into the mainstream of political opinion and manifested in calls to see 
defence policy reflect specific geographical realities and interests. Increasingly this lead 
to uneasiness in abdicating responsibility for the nuclear question to its allies as well as 
increased doubt as to the relevance of traditional concepts of armed deterrence 
through the alliance system in relation to nuclear threats and dangers. 
By the early 1980's therefore New Zealand had not only responded to the global anti-
nuclear movement, it was also beginning to question its traditional alliance 
partnerships and the relevance of these to its security in the nuclear age. The Vietnam 
War had sown the seeds of this disillusionment. The New Zealand contribution had 
been reluctantly agreed upon to ensure continued harmony within ANZUS but 
domestically it had been the cause of much polarisation, as it had elsewhere 
internationally. The effect was twofold resulting in a significant drop in confidence in 
the United States led alliance as well a decline in interest "in alliances and in things 
military in general"4. The rise to power of Ronald Reagan in the United States further 
intensified the anti-nuclear debate as his policy aim was to achieve nuclear superiority 
by the end of the 1980's and as part of his approach he insisted on sending nuclear 
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ships into the ports of alliance partners5. To a nation already aware of the 
environmental dangers it faced from nuclear weapons, due to its proximity to the 
French nuclear testing in the Pacific, this insistence lead to more widespread support 
for the anti-nuclear movement. Not only were there risks of an accident involving 
nuclear material occurring in its waters but the obligations imposed by ANZUS began 
to be perceived as a possible reason for a nuclear attack upon New Zealand and the 
costs therefore too high. The obligation to accept a United States military presence in 
the country where there was no evidence that it had anything to do with contingency 
plans for defending it was increasingly the cause for debate as was the military 
commitments and the maintenance of forces that in their offensive capabilities 
appeared unsuitable for its defence6. Thus given the government's belief that "the 
main danger to New Zealand's security was that of global nuclear weapons 
proliferation and that ANZUS gave little security in relation to this threat, a new 
strategy was needed" 7. 
In its response to the global anti-nuclear movement and the corresponding questioning 
of the viability of traditional alliance structures in the nuclear age New Zealand 
appeared at the beginning of this period to be adopting an approach that mirrored 
international trends yet in its existing alliances it was still subject to the constraints and 
obligations that small state theories prescribe. Despite its limitations as a small state, 
calls were being heard to adopt a foreign policy that articulated the unique position of 
the country and disillusionment with its alliance partners was evident. Globally 
concerns turned to halting the nuclear arms race while regionally New Zealand sought 
to adopt a policy that met its interests whilst taking into account its specific 
geographical location8. The necessity of defence planning to deal with low-level 
incursions and intrusions was beginning to take priority as the lack of any identifiable 
direct threat or perception of threat made further expenditure appear unnecessary. 
Thus New Zealand's focus was on its immediate geographical region and the need to 
maintain stability in the area through regional co-operation and aid. 
Economic and trade policy had also begun to take on greater significance as the 
increasingly interdependent nature of the global economy became more evident. 
Economic concerns were displacing military power as the main determinant of global 
order and "threats of trade wars were replacing more familiar armed confrontations"9. 
The trade blocs which were emerging and the protectionist measures they often put in 
place were proving difficult for a small state to overcome. The relevance of such 
trends had been illustrated in the 1970's with the inclusion of the United Kingdom in 
the European Community and from this point New Zealand's foreign policy concerns 
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were increasingly directed towards trade. In light of such changing priorities therefore 
the foreign policy initiatives New Zealand adopted in this period need to be examined 
for evidence of the behaviour and constraints small state theorists believe characterise 
such states so a conclusion can be drawn as to whether such theories are a useful 
model in understanding the direction taken. The changes that occurred internationally 
in this period also make it significant to the study. As relations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union began to thaw in the late 1980' s the bipolar structure that 
had predominated began to crumble. This impacted upon the existing power balance 
thus could be seen to alter the conditions within which small states formulate their 
foreign policy. 
NEW ZEALAND'S ANTI-NUCLEAR STANCE 
As a result of growing support for the anti-nuclear movement the New Zealand 
Labour party began the build up to the 1984 election on an anti-nuclear platform. 
Within the party there had been much debate as to the extent of the policy, whether it 
should endorse a nuclear ban or withdrawal from ANZUS altogether. A policy of 
renegotiating the alliance on an anti-nuclear basis was decided upon at the outset of its 
campaign 10. Labour's subsequent victory in the election was a clear indication of the 
widespread support for its anti-nuclear stance. Thus the policy was soon implemented 
and a strict nuclear-free ban was declared. The United States Secretary of Defence, 
Schultz, responded by announcing that the policy was incompatible with ANZUS, 
claiming that the alliance involved an acceptance of global nuclear deterrence, and that 
the treaty could not be re-negotiated 11 . Events did not however lead to a 
confrontation on the issue until 1985 when the United States requested that the non~ 
nuclear USS Buchanan be allowed to visit New Zealand. "There is strong supposition 
that the American's expected the request to be accepted" as Lange had led Schultz to 
believe that accommodation of such a request was not unlikely 12. However this was 
not so and the request was denied. The American response was immediate, as it 
perceived New Zealand's refusal to be a direct challenge to its policy and held fears of 
contagion13. Intelligence and military ties were severed, diplomatic consultations 
ended and scheduled joint exercises cancelled. Nonetheless New Zealand maintained 
its position signing the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty in August and tabling 
its anti-nuclear bill in December of 1985. 
Small state theories emphasise the need for such states to carefully manage their 
foreign policy to avoid confrontations, especially with more powerful allies, as the 
costs incurred may otherwise be high. In its decision to become nuclear-free there was 
widespread concern, and even threats at the time, as to the costs it would incur. 
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Immediately following the announcement the Americans did cancel all scheduled joint 
exercises, personnel exchanges and intelligence sharing but there were clear 
boundaries set to the 'punishment'. Despite having no "strategic or economic incentive 
to take special care with New Zealand: it could act decisively and know that it would 
not suffer any consequences", the areas effected remained within the sphere of military 
co-operation and threats as to trade sanctions never eventuated 14. New Zealand's 
status was formally demoted in 1987 from that of ally to friend however "diplomacy, 
trade and cultural exchange continued as vigorously as before the dispute" 15. By 1991 
high level official contact had resumed although ANZUS still had not returned to the 
full tripartite relationship that it had been previously. 
However upon examination there is evidence of careful management to reduce the 
likelihood of costs being incurred as theorists predict, as well as evidence to suggest 
that the government believed the United States would not react as staunchly as it did. 
The international climate and the American adherence to the Non~Proliferation Treaty, 
as well as the Antarctic Treaty and the Treaty of Tlateloco for Latin America, lulled 
the government into believing a pattern had been established ensuring a moderate 
response16. Once the decision was taken and America's disapproval was made clear 
New Zealand immediately moved to reduce the costs of its actions. From the outset of 
the dispute New Zealand was quick to emphasise the non-nuclear nature of ANZUS 
and that, contrary to American claims, it did not require the acceptance of global 
nuclear deterrence 17. On this basis it stressed the decision to become nuclear free 
represented a challenge to nuclear proliferation not to the United States, or any other 
traditional ally, and that it would continue to meet its ANZUS obligations through 
non-nuclear conventional means 18. Lange countered arguments made by the United 
States that the New Zealand policy contravened their neither confirm nor deny policy 
stating it would make its own assessment and so would not require a declaration on 
the part of the Americans 19. He also emphasised that the policy, whilst being 
appropriate for New Zealand and its region, was not for export. Claims that nuclear 
weapons had no relevance to the defence of the region deliberately left room for 
debate as to their relevance elsewhere as Lange had been warned by his foreign affairs 
advisers that "he would not be able to advance the cause of disarmament if he 
challenged the existence of the nuclear deterrent, on which so many countries in the 
West had pinned their faith"20. 
Attempts at compromise were also made throughout the period to return to full 
operation of the ANZUS alliance. In 1987 amendments were made to the nuclear free 
Bill to give blanket clearance to foreign military aircraft where New Zealand was 
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satisfied that they were not carrying nuclear weapons and an inquiry into allowing 
nuclear-powered ships to bypass the legislation was undertaken in 1991, "an initiative 
aimed at improving relations with the United States and, in future, resuming trilateral 
ANZUS participation"21 . The Bill itself had also been put on hold while the Minister 
of Defence undertook negotiations with Schultz, although the signing of the South 
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty in the interim left little room for manoeuvre22. 
External dimensions and comparisons were also stressed in an attempt to set a 
precedent for compromise. Attention was focused by New Zealand upon other 
countries who "although formally aligned to the United States, placed various 
qualifications, if only declaratory, on their willingness to accept nuclear weapons on 
visits to their territories, be it land, air or sea"23 . New Zealand continued therefore "to 
formulate its position as one concerned solely with the matter of nuclear weapons, not 
with the alliance as a whole" and attempts to placate the Americans are evident 
throughout24. 
The consequences of its actions were not however restricted to the sphere of ANZUS 
as internationally New Zealand was criticised for weakening the Western alliance 
system and its policy was condemned as unrealistic and disruptive25. Both the 
Australians and the British voiced their disapproval, with the British warning that its 
ability to uphold New Zealand's position as regards continued access to the European 
Community had been made more difficutt26. Although these criticisms soon abated it 
did experience a lose in leverage with traditional allies as its reliability and consistency 
were questioned. The lack of international condemnation of the bombing of the 
Rainbow Warrior was evidence of this. The Americans unwilling to antagonise France, 
which was much more strategically significant to it than New Zealand, offered no 
condemnation despite the continued ties that did exist27. The British too, aware of the 
tenuous nature of relations amongst European Community nations, also avoided 
involvement. Attempts to restore New Zealand's standing as a reliable ally were 
evident such as the contribution made to the United States sponsored United Nations 
force sent to Iran in 1991. Seizing the opportunity to again play a part in the Western 
collective security system and renew contact with both Britain and the United States it 
was quick to pledge support28. This offer of support was made despite the potentially 
negative impact of such a move upon the trade links it was beginning to develop in the 
area and is evidence of the sort of careful management small state theories predict are 
the result of the lack of leverage and vulnerability such states often experience. 
However, considering the threat the Americans believed this action posed to the 
"overall fabric of Western security', and the lack ofreasons for it to tread carefully, the 
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treatment of New Zealand by both the Americans and others internationally appears 
very lenient29. Perhaps unwilling to be seen as the aggressor, especially where a small 
state was concerned, the American reaction was tempered. The Americans also faced 
constraints that New Zealand, albeit by chance, was able to exploit thus avoiding harsh 
repercussions. Because the anti-nuclear issue had become such a world-wide sensitive 
one the United States had to tread carefully. "Lange highlighted the fact that the 
United States seemed to be bullying a small and loyal ally when the door remained 
open for further negotiations"30. The Americans therefore had to be seen to respond 
to the perceived disloyalty yet were anxious not to sour relations with other allies who 
also had strong anti-nuclear views such as the Scandinavian countries. Thus the 
potential for costs, which small state theorists emphasise, appear to have been avoided. 
In this case the benefits of small size and the wider international context interacted in 
such a way as to have outweighed the disadvantages in a manner small state theories 
do not account for. The easing of the Cold War which occurred in the latter part of the 
1980's also altered the international environment in New Zealand's favour. Super 
power relations improved bringing with it progress on arms control and a weakening 
of the power blocs. "Inevitably this change in climate made things easier for small 
countries that wished to pursue independent initiatives" and thus its actions were set in 
a new context which was more favourable31 . The British threats as to possible 
consequences came to nothing and it did in fact allow for a greater flow of information 
into New Zealand, at least informally, to offset what had been 1ost32. The Australians 
too made it clear that the trans-Tasman link would not be affected by the dispute. 
When examining the decision to ban nuclear ships and its aftermath it is necessary 
therefore to look to the external conditions New Zealand was responding to, and 
working within, to understand how it was able to act in a manner contrary to that 
which small state theories predict. 
The consequences of New Zealand's attempts to reduce the costs incurred did 
however act to dilute the significance of the initiative. McMillan refers to the 
fundamental contradiction that developed within its nuclear ships policy claiming that 
"the government had clearly demonstrated that, having implemented the policy 
banning nuclear ships, it then put New Zealand's international relations before any 
favour that it would gain at home by using international forums to make the case 
against the nuclear deterrent"33. Therefore although appearing to take the initiative 
with little regard to the potential negative consequences it acted quickly to limit the 
damage and did not grasp the opportunity to push the issue further. The decision to 
ban nuclear ships came from public pressure in response to the growing support for 
the global anti-nuclear movement, particularly that of Britain and Australia, yet once 
the decision was made and the disapproval of its allies registered New Zealand was 
quick to avoid any further alienation through careful diplomatic manoeuvring. 
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It must also be noted that the decision itself was made out of the fear of nuclear 
proliferation not as a result of dissatisfaction with the alliance. Therefore whilst 
appearing in its behaviour to counter small state theorists claims that it is necessary for 
such states to align themselves with more powerful nations to meet their security 
needs this was not the case. The decision was evidence of New Zealand responding to 
fears as to the nature of the threats posed to it, as had been the case when ANZUS 
was formed. Thus the break up of the alliance was not based upon genuine 
dissatisfaction with traditional alliance structures but was the result of its anti-nuclear 
stance and one that was regretted throughout the period with significant diplomatic 
energy and resources spent in its attempts to compensate for the loss. Small state 
theories which focus upon the limited capabilities of such states appear in this case to 
be valid as New Zealand, in its attempts to provide for its security in a changing 
environment, not only lost the support of a major ally but also incurred costs in its 
attempts to compensate. 
The significance of the changing international environment must therefore be taken in 
to account in an examination of the impetus for New Zealand's stance on the nuclear 
issue and its subsequent actions. Growing support for the anti-nuclear movement 
globally and the increased awareness of the dangers posed which could only be solved 
at the international level was reflected within the country to the extent that the issue 
became one of domestic politics. The anti-nuclear movement within New Zealand 
found its roots in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Britain and the Labour 
Party line was closely aligned to that ofits Australian counterpart34. In the arguments 
aimed at appeasing the Americans, international comparisons were also drawn upon 
whereby New Zealand sought to justify its actions by alluding to the global dimensions 
of the movement and the changing nature of alliance structures. Parallels with the 
powerful peace movements in Germany and Japan were emphasised as were alliance 
partnerships that involved conditions as found in Iceland, Ireland, Norway and 
Denmark35. Therefore the significance of the international environment and its 
corresponding effect upon New Zealand's actions can not be overlooked. Although 
the first country to apply such conditions on an alliance relationship with the United 
States, the pressure internally from the peace movement, which found its roots abroad, 
and the global nature of the nuclear issue prompted the decision. That New Zealand 
felt it was able to take such an initiative where Australia failed to, even when its 
Labour Party gained power, is perhaps illustration of the varying constraints each 
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faced. Australia as a middle-sized power, geographically more exposed than New 
Zealand clearly felt more constrained in its desire to maintain the United States 
security guarantee. It is the interaction between influence at the international level and 
factors that relate to size therefore that shaped this foreign policy initiative. 
Small state theories often refer to the moral nature of the foreign policy of such states 
although as examined some debate exists as to the validity of this claim. The morality 
of the anti-nuclear stance New Zealand adopted in this period itself reflects this debate. 
Although in appearance setting a moral example, its actions following the passing of 
the Nuclear Free Bill undermined the genuine nature of such claims. In its attempts to 
appease the Americans it avoided pushing its case beyond the South Pacific region and 
its attempts at compromise watered down the original initiative. The impetus behind 
the decision was an awareness of the growing global anti-nuclear movement also, 
therefore it represented the following of international trends . 
The potential for personal and bureaucratic influence make an examination of the role 
of individual policy-makers and the bureaucracy useful in an understanding of the 
foreign policy of this period. David Lange became a strong advocate of the anti-
nuclear movement and once elected he voiced his views strongly, gaining much 
domestic political support. However in doing so he was instrumental in antagonising 
the United States in a manner uncharacteristic of small states in alliances with more 
powerful allies. Thus when the Labour party were defeated in 1990, although they 
were unable to reverse the decision due to popular support, considerable progress 
was made in healing the rift between New Zealand and the United States. The 
influence of the bureaucracy over foreign policy formulation was also evident. On the 
recomendation of his foreign policy advisers Lange did temper his anti-nuclear rhetoric 
abroad to prevent further alienation. These factors combined therefore emphasise the 
necessity of looking to internal domestic factors to aid in the understanding of the 
decisions made. 
1987 DEFENCE REVIEW 
As it became evident that New Zealand could no longer secure its defence interests in 
conventional terms within the ANZUS alliance the government decided to undergo an 
extensive defence review. Its decision to ban nuclear ships, which in effect ended its 
close association with the United States and its reliance upon the concept of nuclear 
deterrence, had drastically limited the national options in the defence field36. A review 
was therefore initiated which for the first time incorporated a large public component. 
The results of the review released in 1987 took into account the findings of a public 
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opinion poll which was carried out the year before covering issues such as threat 
perception, alliances, the nuclear ship ban and preferred defence options. The report 
concluded that as little or no immediate threat of invasion posed itself defence efforts 
should be focused on credible and feasible lower level threats while maintaining a basis 
for expansion should more serious threats emerge37. The centrality of the ANZAC 
relationship was reaffirmed with a focus on self-reliance in partnership with Australia, 
while ANZUS continued to be of significance but in conventional terms only38. It was 
this review therefore which set the agenda for New Zealand's foreign policy for the 
rest of the period with the emphasis being on regional concerns and the trans-Tasman 
relationship, trade, the United Nations and a return to ANZUS in conventional terms 
only which all require closer examination. 
AUSTRALIA AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC REGION 
The defence review listed as its main goal the achievement of greater self-reliance in 
attaining its security yet the help of Australia was perceived to be central to this. The 
review stressed the basic identity of concerns and the common strategic interests New 
Zealand and Australia shared as the basis for a partnership that would provide a 
"credible South Pacific-oriented defence posture"39. Such a reliance upon a partner to 
achieve its security goals is a characteristic small state theories highlight as a means by 
which a total expenditure can be reached that would otherwise exceed a small states 
capabilities. A relationship of this nature has however costs which advocates of this 
theory believe act to impinge upon a small states autonomy. Nonetheless it was to 
Australia that it turned in an attempt to regain the security guarantees that it had 
experienced as a member of the fully functioning ANZUS alliance. An examination of 
the nature of the relationship therefore and the commitments New Zealand was 
expected to make as part of the alliance is necessary to ascertain if it experienced the 
costs that theorists believe impinge upon a small states autonomy. 
In the conclusion of the Defence Review co-operation with Australia was stressed on 
the basis of shared history and strategic concerns. The Australian Defence Review of 
the same year acknowledged the viability of such a relationship but stressed that it 
would be dependent upon a compatibility of equipment and of the capabilities of the 
two forces40. Australia was quick therefore to request the acquisition of compatible 
frigates as a "litmus test on whether New Zealand was serious about trans-Tasman 
defence co-operation"41 . The cost of acquiring the desired frigates was high however 
and disapproval within the country resulted in protests. Following a warning by the 
Australian Prime Minister of the possible adverse economic effects of a failure to meet 
their request the government agreed on a compromise, a commitment to buy two 
instead of four frigates. It also agreed that as an ally of Australia it would "provide 
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assistance wherever it was required for Australia's defence, including Papua New 
Guinea" and consent to a long-term Skyhawks training programme was given 4 2. The 
Skyhawks being more suited to conventional warfare over large land areas were 
clearly more useful to Australia's defence planning yet New Zealand in its willingness 
to illustrate its commitment readily agreed43. 
It can be seen therefore that the partnership with Australia which New Zealand sought 
to replace the United States security guarantee with, incurred considerable costs as 
small state theories prescribe. Not only was it committed to the acquisition of costly 
equipment which had been kept to a minimum under the ANZUS alliance but it was 
involved in training exercises more suited to Australia's defence than its own. Its 
immediate area of strategic concern was widened as the geographical boundaries were 
allowed to be dictated by the Australians whose interests stretched to South-east Asia 
and the Indian Ocean. This extension ofNew Zealand's regional defence focus to 
include South-east Asia proved to be immensely stressful on its resources and thus its 
foreign policy considerations while contributing little in real terms to the security of 
that region44. Australia had clearly adopted the position of leader in the alliance 
pressuring New Zealand to buy the equipment they required and establishing the 
geographical priorities thus taking away its autonomy to assess and plan for its own 
defence. 
As small state theories predict the costs were therefore high and Australia proved to 
be a harder task-master than ANZUS had ever been45. Having lost American support 
however New Zealand faced a lack of alternatives and keenly aware of its limitations it 
was evident that its desire to achieve self-reliance was dependent upon Australian 
backing. Thus the costs of the Australian relationship were high but were borne 
willingly out of necessity as the clear side-effect of its anti-nuclear policy. When, with 
the change of government in 1990, the desire to return to a more international outlook 
was voiced the importance of Australia's support was considered tantamount. 
Especially so when faced with the continued reluctance of the United States to accept 
New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy. "Even restored 'globalism' had to be on Australian 
coat-tails"46. Thus the dependence upon Australia not only illustrates its unwillingness 
or inability to finance true self-reliance but the relationship was clearly not one of 
equals, with the Australians taking the leadership role and dictating the terms. As in 
the earlier period New Zealand let itself be dominated by Australia, both in establishing 
the areas of strategic concern and planning for its defence, as well as providing the 
means by which it could regain its standing internationally. 
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The Defence Review of 1987 also concluded that due to the lack of more far reaching 
threats to New Zealand's security, the South Pacific area become the primary focus. 
This emphasis on its immediate strategic environment would appear to correspond to 
small state theories in that such states are often seen to maintain a narrow focus in 
foreign affairs to reduce the costs incurred and enable a concentration of their scarce 
resources. New Zealand perceived the major threats regionally to its security to be 
economic instability and vulnerability in its area of direct strategic concern thus 
policies directed at development as well as military co-operation were implemented47. 
In the South Pacific progress on establishing security and mutual confidence-building 
dialogue was centred on ASEAN, with Australia's partnership48. The coup in Fiji in 
1987, the Port Vila riots in Vanuatu in 1989 and the continuing conflict in Papua New 
Guinea gave evidence of the need for concern and so, despite budgetary pressures, it 
continued to focus on the South Pacific opening two new diplomatic posts in the 
region in Vanuatu and Kiribati49. 
Regional surveillance systems were also established to compensate for the loss of 
international intelligence as a result of the break with the United States, clear evidence 
of a narrowing of its focus to more affordable alternatives as small state theories 
prescribe. Throughout the period aid schemes were also extended as were tourist links 
with Asia . The threat posed by French nuclear testing in the Pacific was also a major 
concern and New Zealand worked within the South Pacific Forum to push for change, 
evidence again of the benefit to a small state of involvement in multilateral initiatives 
where otherwise it may have difficulty having its voice heard. It signed the South 
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty in 1986 and pushed the South Pacific's anti-nuclear 
message through other international forums. 
However, with the change of government in 1990, came criticism of this inward-
looking, insular focus. National criticised the South Pacific focus as parochial and 
others went so far as to claim that it was the "result of disappointment, frustration and 
disillusionment with older associations and their consequences, and a reluctance to 
accept the world as it was"50. Prime Minister Bolger therefore acknowledging the 
constraints limiting its ability to act independently in all but low-level military 
emergencies stressed the need to co-operate with like-minded nations51 . The 1991 
Defence Review reflected this new outlook in its goal of returning to a more 
traditional Western collective security orientation. However, in light of the lack of 
progress in reaching a compromise with the Americans over its anti-nuclear stance, it 
acknowledged the necessity of retaining Australia's support to enable a return to 
alliance participation. The desire to achieve self-reliance was also foreseen only in 
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partnership with Australia thus acknowledging its inability to finance such a move 
independently. Many of the initiatives it embarked upon in the Pacific and Asia were 
either in partnership with Australia or through multilateral organisations. The 
relationship with Australia proved costly and due to the unequal nature of the alliance 
New Zealand experienced a lose of autonomy within it. Therefore as small state 
theorists prescribe it was forced by economic constraints into an alliance that although 
providing for security that it could not otherwise hope to attain, acted to increase its 
area of strategic concern and impinge upon its autonomy. Later as criticism within the 
country grew as to this narrowing focus the importance of Australia became even 
more evident as New Zealand's inability to reach a compromise with the Americans 
left it with little political voice other than in partnership with Australia. 
COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
Small state theories highlight the role international organisations and their laws have 
the potential to play in the foreign policy of such states. They provide a cost-efficient 
means by which states with limited resources can exert influence and thus enable them 
to pursue their national interests in a broader arena than would otherwise be feasible. 
The ability to fonn coalitions within such organisations also heightens their 
effectiveness as a tool enabling small states to attain their foreign policy goals. New 
Zealand by 1984 had long since established itself as a strong supporter of the United 
Nations keenly aware of the benefits it offered and this record continued. Alongside 
the desire to secure greater self-reliance in its defence policy the 1987 Defence Review 
placed important emphasis upon New Zealand's active membership in the United 
Nations during this period. Although in the early 1980's it had experienced a decline in 
favour within the organisation due its decision to allow the Springboks to tour despite 
the United Nations call to halt all such contact, in 1984 Labour made moves to repair 
this damage. Citing the wish to ensure its defence policy was in line with the United 
Nations and the peace•keeping needs of the organisation, Labour retrieved its role in 
the maintenance ofintemational pressure on South Africa52. Once this was achieved 
New Zealand for the remainder of the period devoted "considerable diplomatic effort 
and financial resources to multilateral diplomacy in the United Nations"53 . 
New Zealand adopted a strong role in the peacekeeping activities of the organisation 
at times contributing aid despite the possible repercussions. In 1991 its troops were 
part of the Sinai Multinational Force and observers were stationed in Lebanon and 
along the Iran/Iraq border54. Considering New Zealand's history of 'even-handed' 
policies in the Middle East due to the increasing importance of the area to attempts to 
diversify its trade markets this contribution was potentially damaging. "The Labour 
government went to quite extraordinary lengths to find a formula which amounted to 
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significant 'involvement' in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter, but 
falling short of 'military' commitment"55. Thus evidence of the careful management 
that small state theorists identify as characteristic of such states was clear in New 
Zealand's actions. This need to walk a delicate path was further complicated by a 
desire to prove itself a valuable member of the Western collective security system in its 
bid to win back American favour. As in the earlier period its commitment to the 
United Nations can in this case not be separated from the benefits it perceived to be 
gained from presenting itself as a willing contributor. At the end of the period New 
Zealand had 200 personnel in five United Nations operations in Africa, Europe and 
Asia as well as observers in Cambodia56. 
The attempts New Zealand made in this period to improve the operation of the United 
Nations appear somewhat more altruistic. With the shifts in the international 
environment which occurred with the easing of the Cold War the organisation was 
freed from many of the constraints that had acted to stifle its effectiveness and there 
was unprecedented growth its peacekeeping operations. Seizing the opportunity, 
lobbying for a seat on the Security Council was undertaken in 1992. The seat was 
secured in October with considerable aid from both the Canadians and the Australians 
who pushed its case57. New Zealand had also inadvertently made itself a more 
acceptable candidate due to its split with the Americans which was seen to make it a 
more independent actor on the international stage58. The Minister of External 
Relations and Trade on accepting the seat claimed New Zealand came to the Security 
Council "with credentials as a strong supporter of the United Nations and an effective 
representative of the interests of small states" 59. 
In the following year as a member of the Security Council it took part in setting up a 
war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and undertook a fact finding mission to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina60. It was also involved in attempts to reform the structure of the 
Security Council and the way it handled its mandate. It criticised initiatives of the 
major powers which sought to obtain Council endorsement for largely unilateral 
operations and in so doing called for greater transparency in its decision making61 . In 
a review ofits membership of the United Nations Templeton claims that on the 
Security Council New Zealand had a freer hand due to its geographical remoteness, 
highly diversified trade and its lack of other vulnerability' s which enabled it to exercise 
an independent voice and to take risks with some success62. However such a claim 
underestimates the degree of self-interest in its involvement in the United Nations. Not 
only did contributions to the organisation provide a means by which New Zealand 
could re-establish its position as a valuable member of the collective security system 
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but it enabled its armed forces to get the overseas training and experience that it no 
longer could through ANZUS63 . Despite domestic economic conditions that put a 
strain on its United Nations involvement, it continued due to the potential global and 
regional benefits it offered a small state, as such theories predict. Whilst appearing in 
the 1990's to have adopted a disproportionately active role in world military affairs, 
upon examination the underlying motivations appear to correspond to small state 
theories as to the potential benefits international laws and organisations offer such 
states. 
Within the United Nations many of the initiatives it was involved in were multilateral 
in nature in its attempts to have its voice heard as small state theorists predict. In 1986 
the seven South Pacific Forum members in the United Nations coalesced into a caucus 
which successfully lobbied to re-inscribe the question of decolonisation of New 
Caledonia on the agenda with New Zealand in part providing leadership 64. New 
Zealand took a strong role in the environmental and disarmament efforts of the · 
organisation also. In 1989 it was elected for a four year term to the governing council 
of the United Nations Environmental Programme and it was one of the three principle 
sponsors of a resolution calling for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons which with the 
thawing of the Cold War was agreed with consensus for the first time65. When 
membership on the Security Council was achieved it was with the strong support and 
lobbying of others and in its role in promoting South Pacific concerns ASEAN 
consultations and Australian partnership were invaluable66. The success these 
initiatives were met with was however more as a result of the changing international 
environment and the corresponding freeing-up of the organisation than an indication of 
New Zealand's ability to enforce its policies. The leadership of many of these 
multilateral initiatives lay with others. 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 
Small state theories focus upon the limited resources and markets commonly 
experienced by such states and the corresponding vulnerability to adverse international 
trends which often accompany such characteristics. The external economic 
dependence and sensitivity thus experienced heightens the risk of foreign penetration 
and means small state foreign policy cannot afford to be isolated from trade concerns 
or relationships. The focus of a small states foreign policy is therefore characterised by 
a clear economic focus and carefully managed to avoid upsetting established trading 
patterns or markets. New Zealand although having achieved some diversification in 
both product and markets was still clearly in a vulnerable position economically at the 
outset of this period and as such would be expected to exhibit the characteristics small 
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state theories highlight. The United Kingdom's joining of the European Community 
had left New Zealand aware of the need to diversify its markets, in conjunction with 
attempts to maintain access to the bloc. Alliance partners provided valuable potential 
for alternative markets with both Australia and America taking ever increasing 
percentages of our total exports. However despite attempts at diversification, trade 
represented a considerable security concern for New Zealand and as such an important 
aspect of its foreign policy. "Many of the most immediate threats to New Zealand's 
national well-being and security in recent years have arisen not from any military 
threats but rather from the possible loss of export markets because of politically 
imposed constraints to agricultural trade"67. As primarily an agricultural producer 
New Zealand was therefore faced with the necessity to tread carefully to avoid adverse 
economic conditions whilst working to reduce protectionism globally. 
Despite the emphasis that small state theorists place on the need to carefully manage 
foreign policy to avoid economic consequences New Zealand began this period by 
announcing its decision to ban nuclear ships. The United States responded by severing 
military ties and threatened the possibility of economic sanctions also. The British too 
hinted at possible repercussions on the ongoing European Community access 
negotiations however neither came to fruition68. This may be attributed to careful 
diplomacy once the announcement was made as neither the United States or the 
United Kingdom had any incentive to treat New Zealand with special care. The lack of 
sanctions imposed would seem to defy the negative aspects of size theorists emphasise 
in the area of trade and the economy. In the following year, despite continued military 
sanctions, trade to North America rose by 49 .14 percent and trade to the European 
Community and Western Europe also rose69. Negotiations with the European 
Community had already begun to prove more difficult in the early 1980's but as a 
result of the 1984 decision New Zealand was forced to negotiate with the Commission 
on its own at the next meeting 7°. Continued access was however still achieved and at 
consequent negotiations Britain again took up its case. New Zealand benefited from 
prebexisting links with the United Kingdom which it was able to exploit in maintaining 
access, a characteristic not addressed by small state theories. Here again both the 
external context within which foreign policy was formulated and envronmental 
determinants must be examined to understand the divergence from traditional small 
state behaviour when exhibited. 
There was however one incident in which New Zealand was unable to prevent the use 
of economic sanctions against it thus exhibiting the economic vulnerability small state 
theorists believe characterise such states. After the bombing of the Greenpeace boat 
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the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbour and the subsequent trial and imprisonment 
of the French agents held responsible, the French government imposed sanctions on 
New Zealand lamb exports in retaliation 71 . Whilst not representing a major upset to 
its trade or economy it did however emphasis its potential vulnerability' s and, the lack 
of support from its allies in condemning this action, its lose of standing in the 
international community. In this instance New Zealand's dependency and vulnerability 
as a small state were particularly evident. Internationally it was unable to get even its 
allies support as the French represented a far stronger and more strategically 
significant state. 
During the period New Zealand endeavoured to establish new markets for its products 
with the Middle East proving significant. The delicacy of negotiations however 
became evident in 1991 with the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq, and here 
evidence of careful management was clear. It attempted to maintain the policy of even-
handedness that it had established in the Middle East yet was anxious to meet the 
United States requests for the United Nations involvement. It walked a delicate path in 
an attempt to make a commitment "which would permit a flexible response to the 
United States in terms of an international peace conference, while maintaining good 
economic and political relations with neighbouring Iran and the other littoral states of 
the Gulf .. "72. It appeared New Zealand succeeded in this endeavour as talks aimed at 
fostering trade continued with Iran after the conclusion of the war thus again it was 
able to overcome the difficulties small state theories attribute in the area of trade. 
In line with the regional focus announced following the Defence Review and the 
subsequent desire to broaden this to the Asian Pacific region new trade links were 
established in this area hence attempting to overcome the constraints small states often 
face as regards narrow markets. By 1991 South Korea had become the fourth largest 
market and soon after economic links with Vietnam were established 73 . Australia too 
began to take on a new significance as the policy of Closer Economic Relations(CER) 
was adopted. CER negotiations continued throughout this period achieving progress 
on the elimination of trade barriers with Australia. However Europe and the United 
Kingdom remained its most significant and stable trade destination and this was 
reflected in New Zealand's preoccupation with European Community negotiations and 
the successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round of GATT in this period. Faced with a 
powerful bloc like the European Community it was clear it lacked bargaining power as 
small state theories predict. In negotiations it played on the United Kingdom's sense of 
responsibility stressing historical ties in an attempt to maintain access 7 4. This 
approach met with moderate success in that the United Kingdom remained the biggest 
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and most stable market for two of New Zealand's most important exports, butter and 
lamb. Thus it seems it was again able to rise above the constraints small state theories 
emphasis and achieve success even where it had little leverage. To understand how this 
was achieved its colonial heritage must be taken into account. 
The successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations was also a 
major area of concern as international trade and emerging trade blocs were beginning 
to take on greater significance. As a small state reliant upon a limited range of 
products and markets New Zealand was finding itself increasingly disadvantaged when 
faced with the protectionist measures such blocs often implement. However as small 
state theories prescribe it managed to achieve some success by exerting influence 
through multilateral initiatives. Globally, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
economic power was becoming more important than military and even the United 
States focus shifted from foreign to domestic concerns 75. In such a climate New 
Zealand was able to join with like-minded nations in its attempts to not only conclude 
the GATT Round but to add agricultural concerns to the agenda. The Cairns Group 
formed in 1987 and including representatives of ten developing countries along with 
Australia, Canada, Hungary and New Zealand aimed to co-ordinate a strategy for 
efficient agriculture exporting countries to put forward initiatives to the Uruguay 
Round. The Cairns Group worked alongside the United States. This further aided its 
effectiveness as the leverage afforded to the United States in Europe drastically 
increased with the collapse of the Soviet Union. This lead to instability in the area 
which required the assistance of American military might to contain it. Within the 
Cairns Group New Zealand and Australia worked closely together as they did in the 
Eminent Persons Group on World Trade, another multilateral initiative aimed at 
pushing for a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Despite such initiatives 
however the success met with was limited as agriculture remained largely excluded 
from the scope of negotiations mostly due to European Community and Japanese 
resistance 76. 
It is evident therefore that New Zealand did experience the vulnerability' s small state 
theories believe characterise such states in the international trade arena. It was effected 
by adverse trends it had little power over and unless initiatives were embarked upon 
with like-minded nations little could be done to counter such conditions. Even then 
these initiatives were met with limited success unless the aid of the United States could 
be enlisted. At times however it was seen to rise above the constraints it faced in a way 
small state theories do not account for. In its negotiations with the European 
Community continued access was agreed upon, although at a decreasing rate, despite 
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the lack of bargaining power New Zealand maintained. The lack of trade sanctions 
following the ANZUS dispute was also fortunate as the United States had little 
incentive to treat it with care. Assumptions that traditional alliance structures assist 
economic aims by providing stable markets must therefore be tempered as despite the 
break in ANZUS trade with the United States continued to grow 77. In partnership 
with Australia New Zealand was able to re-establish dialogue on economic and trade 
policy with the United States and exert influence it could not have otherwise, whilst 
establishing between the two mutually beneficial trade relations. Thus the constraints it 
faced as a small state were altered by the international balance of power and 
environmental determinants which must be taken into account ifNew Zealand's 
foreign policy is to be adequately explained. 
1984-1994: THE FOREIGN POLlCY OF A SMALL STATE? 
It is clear upon examination that in this period New Zealand did experience conditions 
small state theorists identify as characteristic. Economically it was prone to 
vulnerability due to the limited range of its products for export as well as its markets. 
Internationally protectionist measures beyond its control or influence were making 
diversification difficult and attempts to influence such trends were met with limited 
success. Traditional markets were also effected by these trends as is evident in 
Britain's membership in the European Community and faced with such a powerful 
organisation the leverage New Zealand maintained was clearly diminishing. Both the 
United States and the United Kingdom were quick when the ANZUS dispute erupted 
to threaten economic sanctions making New Zealand acutely aware of its tenuous 
position and lack of influence. The need to protect markets already established 
therefore involved an element of political quiescence on New Zealand's part as small 
state theorists predict and careful management was seen throughout as evident in the 
debate as to the nature of the contribution to the Iran/Iraq War. 
New Zealand's security arrangements in this period also conform to the pattern small 
state theorists identify as characteristic. It was, faced with limited human and material 
resources, aware of its inability to defend its own territory as had been the case in the 
earlier period. However now the most prominent perceived threat was identified as 
that posed by nuclear weapons and their proliferation. In an attempt to meet this threat 
the decision was made to ban nuclear ship visits, a decision with consequences that 
proved costly due to the limitations it experienced as a small state. The relationship 
with Australia, adopted in an attempt to compensate for the loss of the United States 
security guarantee, proved to be more costly both in the acquisitions it deemed 
necessary and in the breadth of the contribution expected whilst the shortfalls of the 
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relationship were clear. The Australians' assumed leadership and the economic strain it 
imposed upon New Zealand acted to impinge upon its autonomy as small state 
theories predict. 
However it is necessary to examine the wider international context to understand why 
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this policy was adopted. The decision to enact the nuclear ship ban, whilst appearing 
to disregard the notion that small states must carefully manage their affairs with regard 
to alliance partners, was made in the belief that nuclear weapons represented the most 
pressing security concern it faced and on the assumption that the American response 
would not be as uncompromising as it was. Attempts to win back American favour 
then characterised the rest of the period with considerable diplomatic effort being 
expended to regain the security guarantee it had lost and which it could not hope to 
meet alone. This resulted in an element of political quiescence on New Zealand's 
behalf as it resisted the opportunity to push its anti-nuclear stance abroad so as not to 
further alienate itself This inaction undermined the significance of its stance due to the 
nature of the issue, requiring as it did international co-operation if it was to be 
successful in halting the world wide proliferation of nuclear weapons. It can be seen 
therefore that New Zealand's independence of action in this period was, as small state 
theories prescribe, necessarily restricted by its defence commitments and trade 
arrangements. Lacking the resources to provide for its own security and vulnerable to 
international pressure with regards to trade it was necessary to adopt foreign policies 
aimed at alleviating these conditions. As small state theories highlight these policies 
however often resulted in a loss of autonomy or in political quiescence. 
Small state theorists identify the need for such states to carefully manage their foreign 
policy behaviour and decision-making to avoid confrontation. The risks involved can 
therefore be minimised and the costs kept to a level within a small states potential to 
meet. Evidence of such careful management in the policies adopted by the New 
Zealand government during this period is clear. As already established once the 
decision to ban nuclear ships was made a policy aimed at avoiding further 
confrontation with America was adopted. It argued the policy was anti.:nuclear not 
anti-American and throughout made attempts to reach a compromise. The stance was 
deemed 'not for export' and the geographical realities of its position stressed, as the 
justification for the policy therefore excluded its viability for others in the Western 
alliance system. Through the United Nations it also sought to regain favour by 
supporting United States sponsored initiatives such as involvement in the Iran/Iraq 
War in 1991 despite the potential costs involvement incurred. Aware of the need to re-
establish itself as a valuable and reliable ally this contribution was made willingly. 
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In its relationship with the United Kingdom, especially with regard to the European 
Community, a similar pattern is evident. Although decreasing steadily, the United 
Kingdom still provided the largest and most stable market for its agricultural produce 
and thus negotiations with the European Community over continued access required 
careful handling. Considering the lack of leverage it maintained over the Community, 
the support of the United Kingdom was essential in presenting its case. The 
relationship with Australia, stressed in its bid to compensate for the loss of American 
support, also required careful management. This resulted in New Zealand accepting a 
wider area of strategic importance than it would have otherwise as well as capitulation 
to Australian pressure in the acquisition of costly military hardware. As small state 
theories predict therefore it was, due to the limitations it faced, forced to comply with 
the wishes of its more powerful allies or adopt behavioural restrictions in the 
management of its alliance relations to avoid costly alternatives or consequences. 
International laws and organisations are a tool often utilised by small states according 
to theorists and again New Zealand was seen to follow this pattern during the 1984-
1994 period. It re-established its standing in the organisation following the debate over 
sporting contact with South Africa and adopted an active policy within, culminating in 
membership on the Security Council in 1992. The initiatives it was seen to support 
during the period were as small state theories predict primarily multilateral in nature. 
Thus ascertaining leadership is difficult and the influence of Australia can not be 
overlooked. The thawing of the Cold War and the subsequent increase in the potential 
for successful initiatives within the organisation is also significant during this period. In 
such an environment small states in collaboration were able to achieve a degree of 
influence which had previously not been possible. New Zealand's involvement in such 
initiatives must therefore be put into context and the impetus attributed h1 a large 
degree to the changing international environment to which it was responding. In this 
changing world structUre it was becoming evident also that within the United Nations 
success of any initiative was dependent upon the United States which, after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, represented the most powerful nation. Considering the 
tenuous nature of the relationship between New Zealand and America this connection 
is not insignificant in shaping the direction New Zealand took during the period with 
many of the resolutions it adopted being those sponsored or supported by the United 
States. Again therefore the external context was instrumental in shaping foreign policy. 
Other tools and tactics New Zealand adopted in this period correspond with those 
believed to be peculiar to small states. Theorists maintain that due to resource 
constraints the nature, operation and effectiveness of a small states foreign policy is 
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characterised by the use of tools which minimise the costs incurred. A narrow focus in 
foreign policy is one such characteristic and there is clear evidence of this in the tactics 
New Zealand adopted in this ten year period. Following the withdrawal of American 
support the 1987 Defence Review stressed the need to focus on the immediate region 
with the aid of Australia. Due to an awareness of the limitations New Zealand faced 
with regard to providing for its own security there was little other choice available to it 
than to deliberately narrow its focus to an area it could more feasibly cover. Even then 
however this could only be achieved in partnership with another. By co-operating with 
other like.minded nations, another tactic believed to characterise small states, New 
Zealand was also able to achieve some of its policy aims. Initiatives it supported in 
both the United Nations and in the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations were 
multilateral in nature and thus afforded greater success than it could have hoped to 
achieved alone. The question ofleadership does however pose itself as it becomes 
difficult to ascertain New Zealand's role in such initiatives given Australian 
involvement and the dominant position that country had adopted. 
New Zealand's involvement in economic and developmental programmes in this period 
is further evidence of the type of foreign policy behaviour that small state theorists 
believe to be characteristic. In its regional focus the necessity of attaining security 
through such policies was emphasised due to the cost efficient nature of such an 
approach. The policies it adopted reflected this therefore with increases evident in 
many of its aid programs in the South Pacific. Once again however many of these were 
in collaboration with Australia. 
The use of persuasion or rhetoric is another tool theorists identify as characterising 
small state foreign policy as both provide a cheap means of pursuing a goal. New 
Zealand in its negotiations with the European Community adopted such an approach in 
its attempts to retain the United Kingdom's support ofits case. Lacking other forms of 
leverage it stressed historical ties thus appealing to Britain's sense of responsibility to 
its former colony. A similar method was utilised in convincing Australia of the viability 
of partnership. Creating good~will through its actions was another tactic New Zealand 
utilised in this period which corresponds to the behaviour small states theorists see as 
characteristic. In its contribution to the Gulf War of 1991 it saw the opportunity to 
regain some of the status that it had lost within the Western alliance and therefore was 
willing to do so despite the potential consequences to the markets it was establishing 
in the area. Behaviour of this nature typifies small states which lack the resources to 
more actively pursue their foreign policy. 
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The impact of Lange on New Zealand's anti-nuclear stance is evidence of the potential 
for personal influence in the foreign policy of small states, yet this was diluted at the 
insistence of his advisers thus exhibiting characteristics associated with the 
bureaucratic approach to the study of foreign policy. The impact of the domestic 
political environment was also a strong factor in the anti-nuclear stance as evident by 
the change of Nationals policy leading up to their election success. The divergence of 
policy over the nuclear ship issue between National and Labour at the outset of the 
period diminished as the political realities of the situation became evident. National 
increasingly aware of the popularity of the decision altered its stance on the issue 
before the 1990 election which then resulted in their success. Therefore the change of 
government did little to alter the direction of its foreign policy. Although National 
remained critical of the policy that had resulted in the narrowing of its outlook it was 
aware of their necessity in light of the popularity of the decision domestically. Thus 
domestic considerations must be taken into account. 
Within small state theories the debate as to the moral nature of small state foreign 
policy has been examined and, as with the first period, New Zealand's stance during 
the years 1984-1994 reflects this debate. Although appearing to take the moral high 
ground over the nuclear issue its response to the criticism it experienced undermined 
this stance. To avoid further American disapproval it failed to pursue the issue 
internationally, a step necessary if the initiative was to achieve any significant progress. 
A fundamental contradiction therefore developed within its anti-nuclear policy that 
was not reconciled until the international environment altered and attempts at 
disarmament made real progress. 
In conclusion therefore New Zealat1d did experience the constraints that typify small 
states and as such its foreign policy exhibited the characteristics theorists identify. Due 
to the limitations it experienced as a result of size it remained dependent and 
vulnerable. This was particularly evident in the failure of New Zealand to rally 
international support in condemning the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior. Its actions 
reflected this vulnerability in its security arrangements as well as trade, with careful 
management characterising these alliances. When it failed in its careful maintenance of 
these relationships, although the sanctions experienced were not great, much 
diplomatic energy was expended in attempts to reinstate them and alternatives adopted 
to compensate proved costly. The Australian relationship was attributed such 
significance that it resulted in a loss of autonomy on New Zealand's behalf and as such 
dictated much of the direction its foreign policy followed. As with the first period the 
significance of the relationship with Australia must therefore occupy a central part in 
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the study of New Zealand's foreign policy as it was in this close partnership with a 
middle-sized state that it developed its approach. Thus alternative theories that 
examine the wider context and the external parties involved would prove to be of use 
in these circumstances. The significance of the international environment must also be 
taken into account as much of New Zealand's foreign policy was a manifestation of 
global trends, such as the anti-nuclear movement. The changing international 
environment made it possible for small states to achieve policy aims through the 
United Nations and other organisations which had not been possible previously, 
especially when acting in collaboration with others. The need to acknowledge the 
influence of the wider environment upon the foreign policy of a small state appears 
therefore to be necessary in this instance if the model is to be of use in the study of 
New Zealand foreign policy during this period. The leverage it was able to achieve, 
despite the lack of resources it maintained, and the avoidance of harsh sanctions as a 
result of its behaviour also appear to counter small state theorists claims. New 
Zealand, in part because of its small size and vulnerability, avoided incurring costs that 
theorists believe its size and lack of leverage would have made unavoidable. Thus 
traditional small state theories not only fail to acknowledge the impact of global trends 
but also the potential benefits available to such states due to their size. In conclusion 
therefore whilst providing some explanation as to the direction of New Zealand's 
foreign policy from 1984-1994 small state theories prove inadequate in their failure to 
acknowledge the significance of changes in the international environment as well as the 
prominence of Australia's role in shaping its policy. It is in the interaction between 
variables from all perspectives that a more comprehensive understanding can be 
achieved. 
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After studying the foreign policy of New Zealand in the two designated time periods 
the question to be asked is whether the criticisms made of traditional small state 
theories were evident and if so can the alternative model proposed meet these 
criticisms. Criticism followed two lines: one focussing on the failure of such models to 
account for diversity, the other emphasising the changing international environment. 
Small state theory, originating as it did from studies based in Europe, is criticised for 
failing to accommodate the increasingly diverse nature of such states. The early 
literature also primarily concerned itself with the question of viability. With the 
increase in number of international actors and organisations diffilsing power, as well as 
increased regionalism and fragmentation, critics perceive small states to be less 
constrained in their actions, thus the question of viability is no longer as significant. 
Critics maintain that by failing to integrate wider explanatory variables small state 
theories lack the ability to account for change and diversity. When traditional small 
state theories are applied to New Zealand there is clear evidence of such shortfalls. 
While in many areas the foreign policy exhibited by New Zealand in both periods did 
display behaviour characteristic of small states, in other significant areas it was seen to 
overcome or bypass the constraints it faced. It is in these instances that the role of 
alternative theories, and their interaction with aspects of size, must examined. 
1944-1954 
In this early period New Zealand clearly showed evidence of the conditions that small 
state theories identify. Both economically and physically it found itself dependent upon 
others to meet its security requirements and was therefore vulnerable to external 
influence. Tools identified by small state theorists as being characteristic of such states 
were utilised to alleviate this insecurity, as evident in the alliances maintained with 
both the Commonwealth and the United States. Within these alliances careful 
management was evident to avoid incurring undue costs. Its active involvement in the 
United Nations also appeared to justify small state claims as to a reliance upon 
international laws and institutions yet the strong Australian leadership provided in this 
area makes assessing this commitment difficult. 
New Zealand's diplomatic service did face constraints of the nature small state theories 
highlight and the resources it commanded were consequently limited. Tools designed 
to maximise influence whilst avoiding costs were therefore utilised as small state 
theories predict. The taking of a moral stance as a foreign policy tool was one such 
characteristic theorists stress and there was evidence of this in the foreign policy 
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approach adopted. When it proved useful, such as within the United Nations and 
during the negoiation of peace settlements after World War Two, it stressed its moral 
stance. Due to its continued involvement in Europe, as well as an increased awareness 
of its geographical realities, it did however exhibit a far wider foreign policy focus than 
would be expected. 
Therefore New Zealand clearly exhibited the characteristics theorists associate with 
small size in this period yet in several significant areas its behaviour diverged from that 
expected. How and why this occurred proves important, particularly in light of the 
criticisms levelled at such theories. A significant factor that was influential in shaping 
foreign policy in this period was its ex~colonial status. New Zealand found itself tom 
throughout between its loyalty to the United Kingdom and its desire to move towards 
the United States, at least in terms of security arrangements. This lead to a wider 
foreign policy focus than small state theorists believe characteristic, therefore lending 
credibility to criticisms of the Euro-centric nature of the model and its failure to take 
into account environmental and societal context. The impact of historical or pre-
existing ties, as well as geographical location, are not taken into consideration. 
In juggling its two major allies New Zealand was also able to take advantage of its 
position thus overcoming constraints associated with size. Commitments to both the 
Korean War and the war in Inda-China were stalled using the Commonwealth 
hesitancy as justification. Careful management enabled New Zealand to retain its close 
relationship with the United Kingdom whilst securing an American commitment. 
Claims that by focussing on the limited viability of small states such theories fail to 
acknowledge the potential benefits appear to hold true in this instance. Similarly New 
Zealand's relationship with Australia enabled it to benefit from the weight Australia 
wielded as a middle~sized power without exposing itself to the full-force of potential 
repercussions. Thus by virtue of its size and the increased manoeuvrability it brought, 
New Zealand was able to keep the costs associated with its alliances to a minimum. 
There is also evidence of the failure of small state theories to account for diversity 
even prior to the decolonisation of the post-war period which sparked such claims. In 
this period New Zealand's location played a significant role in shaping its foreign 
policy as this isolation compounded the weaknesses associated with size. It was out of 
a realisation of its vulnerability and isolation in the Pacific that New Zealand sought 
out the American commitment. The close relationship that developed with Australia 
was also the result of this realisation as well as a shared colonial history. This 
relationship and the dominant position Australia adopted, were instrumental in New 
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Zealand's signing of ANZUS, its commitment to the Korean War and its active role in 
the United Nations. 
The impact of external factors and changes in the international environment were also 
significant in shaping New Zealand's foreign policy between 1944-1954 in a manner 
small state theories fail to identify. The events of World War Two still dominated the 
perception of threat thus New Zealand was looking to strengthen its defensive 
position. This was evident in the relationships developed with both the United States 
and Australia. As a move occurred from the initial post-war emphasis on international 
organisations to regional arrangements, as the signing of NATO indicated, New 
Zealand soon followed. Its attention turned from the United Nations to the 
establishment of a similar arrangement for the Pacific. This move away from the 
United Nations, a tool small st-ate theories identify as a cost efficient means of 
alleviating its security concerns, was necessitated by the failure of the organisation as 
the emerging Cold War had rendered it virtually powerless. 
In this period therefore other variables and characteristics, beyond those attributed to 
size, were seen to interact in the formulation of its foreign policy thus reflecting its 
unique historical, cultural, and physical position. Criticisms as to the failure of 
traditional small state theories to account for diversity appear valid. To achieve a more 
comprehensive understanding a multi-causal approach of the sort proposed is 
necessary which, whilst not invalidating small state claims, acknowledges the existence 
of mediating or contextual variables. Of some significance however is that in these ten 
years there was evidence of manoeuvrability on New Zealand's behalf, despite falling 
before changes in the international power balance that critics of small state theories 
believe create such potential. Therefore small state theories, which acknowledge that 
even the weakest of states may benefit from temporary shifts in power and the 
leverage that this may result in, provide a better explanation. 
1984-1994 
In this period despite the significantly altered international environment New Zealand 
clearly exhibited the characteristics associated with a small state. Contrary to claims 
that small state theories were increasingly invalid due to interdependence and the 
increased opportunities this created for such states to overcome the constraints they 
faced, it remained dependent and vulnerable. This was particularly evident in the after-
math of its nuclear-free decision and the careful management necessary to avoid 
incurring costs. Instead of pursuing its anti-nuclear stance globally New Zealand, 
aware of the need not to antagonise its allies further, clearly stated the policy was not 
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for export. Once the United States announced it was withdrawing its security 
guarantee New Zealand was forced to narrow its foreign policy focus to its more 
immediate region aware of its limited resources. The treatment of New Zealand by 
France following the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior also reinforced its limitations. 
Whereas proponents of interdependence theories stress the weakening of state 
boundaries, the rise in supranational organisations and the subsequent easing of 
constraints on small states as providing increased potential for manoeuvrability and an 
equal international standing for all states, New Zealand was clearly still constrained in 
its actions by the resources and power it was able to command. 
Economically New Zealand experienced greater vulnerability than was evident in the 
first period primarily due to the lose ofits guaranteed market in the United Kingdom. 
The protectionist measures increasingly characterising the international market, and 
the large and powerful trading blocs emerging, also emphasised its lack of power. In 
these conditions it sought out like-minded nations to lend weight to attempts to 
protect its interests. Similarly its security arrangements conformed to the patterns 
small state theories identify. The relationship developed with Australia to compensate 
for the lose of the American security guarantee in the Pacific was an alliance of the 
nature believed characteristic and the costs associated with the relationship were high. 
Careful management of alliance partners was evident throughout the period and when, 
in the case of America, its actions were met with disapproval a policy aimed at 
avoiding further confrontation was adopted. 
There is further evidence of the use of tools believed to characterise small state 
behaviour in this period. New Zealand's commitment to the United Nations was for 
example str-engthened in this period as, with the thawing of the Cold War, the potential 
opportunities for a small state within it grew. Within the United Nations it adopted a 
strong moral position based on multilateral initiatives to maximise influence. As a 
consequence of the break in ANZUS it also consciously narrowed its foreign policy 
focus, aware of the limitations it faced with regard to providing for its own security. 
Economic and developmental policies characterised its regional initiatives as it sought 
to create a stable environment. The use of persuasion or rhetoric in achieving its 
foreign policy aims was also evident. In negotiations with the United Kingdom over 
continued trading access New Zealand stressed its historical ties and hence a continued 
sense of responsibility on Britain's behalf Similarly in its bid to upgrade the Australian 
alliance after the break in ANZUS, shared history and geographical proximity were 
highlighted. To regain American favour New Zealand also attempted to establish 
goodwill primarily by supporting American initiatives in the United Nations. This did 
however incur costs as it resulted in a commitment being made to the Gulf War, 
despite the tenuous nature of the ongoing trade negotiations it was involved in the 
Middle East. As with the first period New Zealand did stress the moral nature of its 
foreign policy when it suited, such as over the anti-nuclear stance, however this was 
subsequently undermined when it failed to push this stance abroad out of the fear of 
alienating the Americans further. 
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As with the first period however there was evidence of areas where traditional small 
state theories failed to adequately explain New Zealand's foreign policy. Its post-
colonial status continued to have an impact, not only in its membership of the 
Commonwealth, but also in the leverage it was able to bring to bear in negotiations 
with the European Community. The United Kingdom, despite threats to the contrary, 
argued New Zealand's case, and in a world increasingly characterised by protectionist 
measures, secured continued access for its exports. Without these historical ties a 
small state would have had little ground for consideration. New Zealand's continued 
close relationship with Australia also had a considerable impact. Following its decision 
to ban nuclear ships and the subsequent split with the United States, it was faced with 
limited defence options. Australia therefore became central to its security planning, as 
stated in the 1987 defence review, and was as such in a position to take a dominant 
role in shaping New Zealand's foreign policy. It was instrumental in establishing the 
area of direct strategic concern for both states and in planning for their defence. 
As with the first period evidence of advantages associated with size can be identified, 
highlighting the problems associated with the focus of small state theories on viability. 
In the immediate aftermath of its anti-nuclear decision New Zealand, by emphasising 
its small size ai1d isolation, was able to avoid harsh repercussions. It was also able to 
dilute the response by exploiting constraints faced by the United States. That New 
Zealand carried through with the decision where Australia failed to is indicative of the 
greater freedom New Zealand experienced. Australia as a larger, geographically more 
significant state had more to lose. Where in the first period it played the United States 
and the United Kingdom off against each other to its advantage, in 1991 it used similar 
techniques to protect its interests in the Middle East while avoiding further alienation 
of the United States. New Zealand was seen therefore, to not only overcome the 
constraints associated with its size, but was also able to benefit from it in a manner 
small state theories fail to acknowledge. 
The external environment also impacted greatly on New Zealand's foreign policy in 
this period. The leadership role provided by Australia shaped much of its foreign 
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policy, as did its desire to maintain existing security alliances. The decision to ban 
nuclear ships represented an independent initiative yet the influence of the international 
environment and the global anti-nuclear movement were significant. Its anti-nuclear 
stance, as with its renewed commitment to the United Nations, was spurred by global 
trends. The growth of the anti-nuclear movement in New Zealand was a direct 
response to movements elsewhere in the world, brought to its attention through the 
media and interstate organisations. External pressures were brought to bear and what 
began as a domestic issue was forced on to the international stage as interdependence 
theorists predict. There is evidence therefore that the changing global environment 
impacted upon its foreign policy and thus must be addressed if a more comprehensive 
understanding is to be achieved. 
In both periods therefore whilst small state theories did prove enlightening there is 
evidence of a need to examine the foreign policy exhibited from different perspectives 
and levels of analysis, to integrate the perspectives, thus allowing for greater 
understanding. As outlined in Chapter One an alternative model, aimed at addressing 
the shortfalls identified, would adopt a more comprehensive approach to the study of 
foreign policy by examining both domestic political determinants and the impact of the 
external environment. Given the areas where small state theories failed to identify the 
factors shaping New Zealand foreign policy in the two periods studied, alternative 
theories that address environmental and societal determinants appear the most useful. 
Aspects of decision making-theory that identify environmental and societal 
determinants meet the criticisms made of small state theories. Political structures, 
societal characteristics, historical tradition and geographical location alt, by remaining 
relatively stable, provide for continuity in the field of foreign policy. Thus by studying 
the constraints imposed and the opportunities provided by the situational context a 
greater understanding of foreign policy is gained. In the case of New Zealand such an 
approach accounts for the aspects of its foreign policy where small state theories 
failed. The influence of its post~colonial status for example was evident in both periods 
in its continued commitment to and identification with the United Kingdom. This was 
also seen in the leverage it was still able to bring to negotiations with the European 
Community. Similarly New Zealand's geographical position and isolation was 
instrumental ·in shaping its perception of threat. This was reflected in the means it 
adopted to attain its security, particularly evident in the close relationship with 
Australia. New Zealand's decision to ban nuclear ships in the latter period was also 
largely due to its geographical proximity to French nuclear test sites in the Pacific. 
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Another criticism aimed at small state theories is that over time they have become less 
relevant due to the changing international political environment. Theories have 
developed therefore which focus on the increased evidence of global interdependence 
and how this has resulted in the weakening of state boundaries. In such an 
environment all states are limited in their foreign policy by transnational and 
transgovernmental actors which increase the potential costs involved. If such theories 
are to prove useful in the study of New Zealand foreign policy one would expect to 
see a marked change between the two periods with regard to levels of dependence and 
interaction. However these characteristics were evident throughout. Whilst changes 
· internationally increased the potential for successful coalitions and cooperation in the 
latter period, it exhibited the characteristics theorists associate with interdependence in 
both periods thus theories that relate this to constraints that result from size appear 
more valid. New Zealand in the latter period still clearly developed its foreign policy in 
response to the limitations it faced due to size and this status was reflected in its 
treatment internationally. Upon examination therefore the high levels of dependence 
and interaction that proponents of the interdependence paradigm highlight were 
evident prior to the changes in the international environment. The characteristics 
associated with interdependence correspond to those traditionally attributed to the 
weak and small. 
For small state theories to remain valid in the study of New Zealand foreign policy 
therefore, there are clearly areas where they must be extended if they are to prove 
comprehensive. Firstly by focussing on the problem of small state viability these 
theories fail to identify areas where size can prove advantageous. In both periods 
examined New Zealand was on occasion able to use its size to its advantage. With the 
it1creased opportunities brought by the changing nature of global power distribution 
and interdependence this is an area that small state theories need to address. The 
failure to acknowledge the role of environmental and societal determinants in the 
understanding of a states foreign policy is also problematic and is reflected in the 
inability of such theories to account for the influence of geographical location, 
historical ties and other external forces. In the case of New Zealand its physical 
isolation was as significant as size in defining its security agenda. The central role 
Australia had in shaping its foreign policy in both periods is evidence of this. To make 
a comprehensive study ofNew Zealand's foreign policy in both periods therefore it is 
necessary to acknowledge the interaction of factors both internal and external that 
impacted upon its capacity to act. Clearly external factors and changes on the 
international stage acted to alternatively exacerbate or alleviate the constraints it faced 
as did the unique geographical and historical position it maintained. It is necessary to 
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recognise the impact of mediating or contextual variables which acted to alter the 
relationship between size and the foreign policy behaviour exhibited. To exclude such 
variables is to render the study inadequate thus validating the criticisms outlined at the 
outset. For this to be avoided a more comprehensive multi-causal approach, as 
proposed, is necessary which, whilst not discounting the propositions small state 
theories advocate, acknowledges the interaction between variables and the subsequent 
impact this has upon a states capacity to act. 
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